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ABSTRACT  
 
In recent years, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula has joined an unfortunate category of what I call 
‘Outlaw spaces’: spaces that are characterized and understood as being shaped by crisis, 
chaos and collapse.  Outlaw spaces –which include the “black holes,” the “breeding 
grounds,” the “security vacuums” and the “no man’s lands” that have proliferated in the 
post-9/11 era—are constructed through the interplay of both legal and imaginative 
geographies.  Mapping and labeling certain zones as lawless, chaotic and dangerous is 
deceptive. There is nothing natural about Outlaw spaces and it is not always clear where 
they begin and where they end.  While Outlaw spaces are imagined as law-less, law may 
still be present – even abundant – in the space but works in strategic ways and along 
specific trajectories. Whether Outlaw spaces are dangerous, lawless, chaotic or not, the 
drawing of boundaries and labeling of the spaces they demarcate amounts to a forceful 
exercise of power and has important implications for the ways in which the space will be 
regulated, not regulated or selectively regulated through law.  Conceiving a space to be 
outside the law not only creates truths about that space, it also seeks to provide an 
explanation for the nature of these spaces and in doing so, asserts the opposite qualities of 
in-law spaces that are constructed in their opposition.  These processes of mapping, 
zoning, dividing and labeling of space are not just a tool for the use or non-use of law 
within a space, they also seek to provide a narrative for why the imperial eye of law has 
failed in its efforts to infinitely extend its reach to sanction and transform the Other.  
Rather than sanctioning, transforming or rebuilding Outlaw spaces, they may instead be 
simply contained, controlled, exploited or ignored.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Vast areas of Egypt’s Sinai desert have descended into lawlessness in recent months, 
providing fertile ground for small cells of extremist militants that have emerged from the 
shadows and quietly established training camps near the Israeli border.1  
 
Egypt's Sinai Peninsula […] is now drawing comparisons to the ungoverned tribal 
regions of Pakistan as networks of Bedouin tribes, Sinai's criminal elements and radical 
Islamists have begun to capitalize on Egypt's post-revolution security vacuum by 
increasingly engaging in drug and arms smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism. The 
escalating lawlessness in the Sinai risks turning the region into a powder keg.2 
 
The Sinai is turning into a kind of Wild West...3 
 
 
We drove down a bumpy dirt road a few kilometers from the Egypt-Gaza border close to 
the Egyptian town of Sheikh Zuweid.  We drove through olive, peach and almond 
orchards and passed an occasional low-lying cement brick house with laundry lines 
fluttering, goats and children looking to see who was coming down the road.  Around the 
next bend in the road, a very different sight came into view.  Perched at the top of a hill 
was a three-story condominium-style house with a brick red Chinese pagoda roof.  A 
vertical pane of metallic blue windows reflected the North Sinai sun back into our eyes as 
we passed.  “That’s the house of a trafficker,” the North Sinai Bedouin man who rode 
with me in the car told me.  When I asked whether these were arms traffickers or human 
traffickers, he responded, “Some of them traffic weapons, some of them traffic Africans.  
I don’t know which one they do, but everyone knows who is making money around 
here.”  Other pagoda style roofs could be seen on the skyline across Egypt’s eastern 
border region, a trend for those who have recently come into money from lucrative cross-
border trade. 
“Trafficking in Africans,” as it is often called in North Sinai, is in reference to a 
phenomenon that has emerged in recent years in which sub-Saharan African migrants and 
asylum-seekers en route to Israel via Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula are kidnapped by their 
                                                
1 Ernesto Londoño, In Egypt’s Sinai Desert, Islamic Militants Gaining New Foothold, WASHINGTON POST, 
(July 13, 2012), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-13/world/35488579_1_islamic-
militants-north-sinai-israeli-forces. 
2  Mark Udall, Sinai Chaos Threatens Egypt-Israel Security, CNN, (July 12, 2012), available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/12/opinion/udall-sinai. 
3 Ori Lewis, Egypt’s Sinai Turning into Wild West: Israeli PM, REUTERS, (April 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/24/us-israel-egypt-sinai-idUSBRE83N0EP20120424. 
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would-be smugglers  who demand increasingly exorbitant ransoms for their release.4  The 
kidnappers use torture, rape and organ extraction to coerce relatives of their victims –
primarily Eritreans fleeing their country’s military dictatorship - to pay the demanded 
ransom.5  In a twist to the smuggling-turned-trafficking narrative,6 many individuals who 
have been swept into the vast trafficking network whose branches reach into Sudan, 
Eritrea and Ethiopia never intended to migrate in the first place, but were kidnapped from 
their homeland or from a refugee camp in northeastern Sudan and brought to the Sinai.7  
It is here, in the borderlands surrounding the towns of Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid, that 
many of them are held while their families try to furnish the funds to secure their release.  
Even for those migrants whose smugglers merely provide transportation and assistance 
for an agreed upon fee, the journey across the Sinai to Israel may prove lethal.  The 
shoot-to-stop policy enacted by Egyptian border guards against those crossing into Israel 
has turned the border into a kill-zone.8 
                                                
4 As of summer 2012, ransoms are reported to have reached as high as $50,000 USD per person. 
See MIRJAM VAN REISEN, MERON ESTEFANOS AND CONNY RIJKEN, HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE SINAI: 
REFUGEES BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH 30 (September 26, 2012) http://www.eepa.be/wcm/human-
rights/3177-human-trafficking-in-the-sinai-refugees-between-life-and-death.html. 
5 Id. at 12, 21, 38-41. See also Fred Pleitgen, Refugees Face Organ Theft in the Sinai, CNN, (November 3, 
2011), available at http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/2011/11/03/refugees-face-organ-theft-in-
the-sinai/ Gianluca Mezzofiore, Eritrea’s Forgotten Refugess: Kidnapped, Tortured, Ransomed and Killed 
in Sinai, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, (April 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/455019/20130409/eritrean-sinai-refugees-egypt-sudan.htm. 
6 One possible legal analysis of the situation faced by migrants in the Sinai is that while their journey 
begins as what would be defined as human smuggling, when the initial ‘business agreement’ is broken and 
exploitation in the form of kidnapping, extortion, torture, rape or organ extraction enter the picture, the 
situation may instead be defined as human trafficking.  Other analyses would argue that what is happening 
in the Sinai does not qualify as human trafficking and would still be defined as human smuggling.  
Theoretically, someone who fits the definition of a victim of trafficking contained in the Trafficking 
Protocol and the 2010 Egyptian legislation written to implement the law at the domestic level would 
receive additional protections and support from the state.  In reality, however, the Egyptian Anti-trafficking 
law has only been applied to a select number of cases related to domestic workers in urban areas and to 
child brides trafficked out of Egypt.  See Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and 
Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention (15 November 2000), A/RES/55/25, Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (15 November 
2000), A/RES/55/25, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) 
(2001), entered into force Dec.25, 2003. 
7  RACHEL HUMPHRIS, REFUGEES AND THE RASHAIDA: HUMAN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING FROM 
ERITREA TO SUDAN AND EGYPT (November 2012) http://www.unhcr.org/51407fc69.html. 
8 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Sinai Perils: Risks to Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers in 
Egypt and Israel, (2008) http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/11/12/sinai-perils-0; REBECCA FURST-NICHOLS 
AND KAREN JACOBSEN,  AFRICAN MIGRATION TO ISRAEL: DEBT, EMPLOYMENT AND REMITTANCES 
(September 2011) https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/42011548/migration-
israel.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1297104037000. 
  3 
A few kilometers after passing the pagoda-roofed house we arrived at our destination, 
a nice but modest house just off the dirt road overlooking a large olive grove.  It was the 
home of a Bedouin sheikh who offers refuge to individuals who have escaped from their 
kidnappers or who have been released by their captors after their families were able to 
provide the ransom demanded.  The sheikh told us that a group of fourteen Eritreans had 
just left his house earlier that week, making their way back to Cairo where they would 
either apply for asylum or continue their journey elsewhere.  He pointed out a large room 
with pillows, blankets and cushions where the Eritreans had stayed.  This was no 
underground hideout or secret back room and had big open-air windows looking out over 
the hills, just meters from the main road.  As we sat drinking tea in the courtyard outside I 
asked the sheikh, who is known in the community for the assistance he provides, if the 
traffickers had ever confronted him for his work or if they had ever come to his house to 
retrieve their “goods.”  “No,” he responded without hesitation, “this would never happen.  
Anyone who sleeps in my house is my guest.  According to Bedouin urfi law they cannot 
cross onto my land or enter my house or harm my guests. They would never dare.” 
*** 
 I came to this thesis through an interest in this story, in the human trafficking and 
smuggling of sub-Saharan African migrants through the Sinai.  In 2011, I was working 
for a Cairo-based organization providing legal assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers 
in Egypt and many of my clients had friends or relatives who had been kidnapped at 
some point along the route to Israel.9  In the months that followed the withdrawal of 
Egyptian security forces from the Sinai in February 2011, the story of kidnapping and 
trafficking in the Peninsula received considerable attention from international media and 
human rights organizations.10  Articles, exposés and documentaries told of unbridled 
                                                
9 Many recognized refugees living in Cairo decide to continue on to Israel due to the difficult economic 
situation in Egypt.  Egypt is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention but which has made a reservation to the 
Article 17 allowing recognized refugees to engage in wage-earning employment in their country of asylum.  
Additionally, the security situation in Cairo during the 2011 uprising and the months that followed was 
particularly difficult for refugees and asylum seekers, many of whom lack identification or whose UNHCR 
cards were not recognized by the police and military personnel manning the large number of checkpoints 
around the city at that time.  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art 17, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 
entered into force April 22, 1954. 
10 Some human rights organizations have been following the plight of migrants in the Sinai since 2008.  
See, for example, Sinai Perils supra note 8, Amnesty International, Egypt Deadly Journeys through the 
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criminal networks, torture, rape and death with the occasional story of rescue or escape.11  
Some of the reports, which continue to be published today albeit with less frequency, 
lament the Egyptian government’s inaction in stopping the traffickers, but acknowledge 
the limitations placed on the military and security forces under the 1979 Peace Treaty 
with Israel.  A typical human rights report on the subject echoes the story told by the 
international media, describing the plight of those held by traffickers, their reasons for 
travel and their horrific experiences in the Sinai.12  The authors then go on to outline the 
extensive legal framework13 applicable to the problem, to criticize the Egyptian 
                                                                                                                                            
Desert, (2008) http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/MDE12/015/2008/en/3254d528-6ae8-11dd-8e5e-
43ea85d15a69/mde120152008en.pdf. 
11 See for example Phoebe Greenwood, Egyptian authorities look the other way as Bedouin kidnap 
refugees, THE GUARDIAN, (February 14 2012), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/14/egypt-bedouin-kidnap-refugees-israel; Emily Alpert, African 
refugees kidnapped, brutalized in Sinai, report says, LA TIMES, (April 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-eritrean-refugees-brutalized-
20130403,0,6113119.story; Jerome Taylor, Forgotten: The Stolen People of the Sinai, THE INDEPENDENT, 
(January 20, 2012), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/forgotten-the-stolen-
people-of-the-sinai-6292201.html; Fred Pleitgen and Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, Bedouin Successes Fighting 
People Traffickers, CNN, (September 19, 2012), available at 
http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/category/death-in-the-desert/; Sarah Lynch, Sinai Becomes 
Prison for African Migrants, NY TIMES, (October 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/world/middleeast/01iht-m01-sinai-
migrants.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
12 See for example Sinai Perils supra note 8, Human Rights Watch, Egypt: End Sinai Nightmare for 
Migrants, 05 September 2012, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/05/egypt-end-sinai-
nightmare-migrants, Human Rights Watch, Egypt: End Traffickers’ Abuse of Migrants, 09 December 2010, 
available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/09/egypt-end-traffickers-abuse-migrants, Amnesty 
International, Egypt: Deadly Journeys Through the Desert, 2008, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/MDE12/015/2008/en/3254d528-6ae8-11dd-8e5e-
43ea85d15a69/mde120152008en.pdf, Physicians for Human Rights, ‘Hostages, Torture, and Rape in the 
Desert: Findings from 284 Asylum Seekers about Atrocities in the Sinai’ 2011, 
http://www.phr.org.il/uploaded/Phr-israel-Sinai-Report-English-23.2.2011.pdf. 
13 The content of the suggested legal framework varies by report but may include Egypt’s “detailed and 
strong” anti-trafficking law, Arab Republic of Egypt People’s Assembly Law No. 64 of 2010 regarding 
Combatting Human Trafficking, as well as international instruments such as the Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air supra note 6; the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children supra note 6; the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees supra note 9; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), 
entered into force June 26, 1987; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1981; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-
20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, entered into force June 20, 1974. Beyond this exhaustive list, one 
report contains a section entitled Application of the Legal Framework in which the writer goes through a 
series of legal acrobatics to fit the situation in the Sinai into distinct profiles with applicable international 
norms.  One such profile is “Trafficking in Persons for the Purpose of Debt Bondage and Forced Begging” 
in which the author makes a rather convoluted argument that the practice of forcing refugees held hostage 
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government for not upholding their legal obligations under the treaties and protocol in 
question, and to encourage them to take the legal measures necessary to address the 
problem.14 
This story, however, is only part of a larger narrative within media and human rights 
reports in recent years, one that frames the injustices occurring in the Sinai as the human 
toll of a larger context of lawlessness and chaos in the Peninsula following the uprising 
that toppled President Mubarak in early 2011.  The kidnapping and trafficking of 
migrants emerges alongside reports of a host of other illicit and dangerous activities in 
the Peninsula: gunmen attack checkpoints and police stations, militants bomb the gas 
pipeline that runs through the Peninsula, heavy weapons and explosives exit Egypt 
through tunnels under the eastern border and Islamic militants enter the country through 
the same tunnels.  The Sinai has been described in some news reports as a potential 
breeding ground for militant Islam, a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and global terrorism and 
even a new Wild West.15  In light of these dynamics, some have declared the current 
situation on the Peninsula to be a security vacuum that could threaten regional peace.16  
Reading these reports on the Sinai, one cannot help but notice the ways in which they 
echo descriptions of a number of other spaces around the globe, in what seems to have 
become a global narrative of ungovernable spaces of lawlessness and chaos.  Following 
the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the 9/11 Commission released an expansive list of 
“terrorist sanctuaries” that included spaces of many scales: regions of countries, countries 
themselves, entire regions of the globe and even “European cities with expatriate Muslim 
communities.”17  In the years that have followed, this sort of spatial reordering has 
                                                                                                                                            
in the Sinai to call their relatives for ransom money qualifies as forced begging, which “has been explicitly 
included in the trafficking definition in some countries and has now been adopted as a possible form of 
exploitation in the EU Trafficking Directive (2011/36), thereby extending the trafficking definition.” 
Refugees between Life and Death supra note 4 at 57-61. 
14 See, e.g., Refugees between Life and Death supra note 4; Deadly Journeys supra note 12; Hostages, 
Torture and Rape supra note 12. 
15 Lewis supra note 1; Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, Egypt’s Wild West, FOREIGN POLICY, (August 24, 2011), 
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/24/egypts_wild_west. 
16 See, e.g. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Sinai: From Absence of State to Political Pawn, 
(August 14, 2012) http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/d9de757f-5b99-4dcd-82c7-74a6b2595f33# (last 
visited  February 15, 2013); NICOLAS PELHAM, SINAI: THE BUFFER ERODES (September 2012) 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/pr0912pelham.pdf. 
 
17 The report lists the following spaces as terrorist sanctuaries: the Afghanistan border region; southern or 
western Afghanistan; the Arabian Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the nearby Horn of 
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produced Rogue States, the Axis of Evil, and “breeding grounds” of all scales that left 
un-addressed threaten to generate terror.  International headlines tell us that Libya’s south 
teeters towards chaos,18 Mali’s north breeds terror,19 Guantanamo is a legal black hole,20 
and Waziristan is a no man’s land.21  Failed states, failed cities and failed neighborhoods 
proliferate as we learn of yet more spaces of lawlessness: Rio slums are ruled by drug 
gangs and militias, neighborhoods in Lagos exist outside state control and post-Hurricane 
Katrina New Orleans descended into disorder.  In recent years, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula 
has been shuffled into this ill-fated category of spaces shaped by crisis, chaos and 
collapse in which the “hundreds of bodies”22 of Eritrean migrants reported in the media 
can only be seen as an unfortunate human toll in an void of uncaused lawlessness and 
violence. 
This spatial imagination of the Sinai prevents us from seeing and understanding 
certain aspects of what is happening on the Peninsula.  By viewing the Sinai as 
ungovernable, we fail to see the selective and strategic ways that the Egyptian state 
intervenes in the space.  The characterization of the Sinai as lawless precludes us from 
seeing that there is, in fact, an abundance of law in the Peninsula and that the exceptional 
regulation of the Sinai through domestic and international law has contributed to the 
construction of the Peninsula as a space that is outside and Other to Egypt’s center.  By 
seeing the space as a chaotic security vacuum, we miss the opportunity to see and to 
challenge the economic and political structures of power at work in the Sinai.  This thesis 
seeks to disrupt the narrative of the Sinai that has emerged since the uprisings that 
toppled President Mubarak in 2011 and to shed light on the relationships of power in the 
                                                                                                                                            
Africa, including Somalia and extending southwest into Kenya; Southeast Asia, from Thailand to the 
southern Philippines to Indonesia; West Africa, including Nigeria and Mali; and European cities with 
expatriate Muslim communities.” THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 366-367 (November 27, 2002) www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. 
18 Jeffrey Fleishman, Libya’s south teeters toward chaos, LA TIMES, (March 30, 3013), available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/middleeast/la-fg-libya-dangerous-
20130331,0,4597838.story. 
19 John Price, Northern Mali a breeding ground for terrorists long before the current crisis, WASHINGTON 
TIMES, (February 20, 2013), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/20/northern-
mali-a-breeding-ground-for-terrorists-lon/?page=all. 
20 Anthony Mason, Guantanamo: Legal Black Hole, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (November 30, 2010) 
available at http://www.amnesty.org.au/hrs/comments/24286/. 
21  Daud Khattak, No Man’s Land, PRAGUE POST, (March 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.praguepost.com/news/15747-no-mans-land.html. 
22 Mike Thompson, Sinai torture for Eritreans kidnapped by traffickers, BBC NEWS, (March 6, 2013), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21670929. 
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Peninsula in ways that may provide a better understanding not just of the Peninsula, but 
of the other no man’s lands, black holes and breeding grounds around the globe that 
regularly appear in the international news. 
While the notion of the Sinai as a troubled space has received intense attention in 
recent years, a history of war and occupation on the Peninsula have meant that the Sinai 
has simultaneously embodied and absorbed many of the long-standing tensions between 
Egypt and Israel and in the larger region.  This thesis explores the ways in which the 
Sinai and its population have been simultaneously included and excluded from Egypt 
along particular political, legal and economic lines. I propose that the relationship 
between Egypt and the Sinai has rendered the Peninsula as a space that is different from 
the rest of Egypt, a part of—yet somehow outside of –Egyptian territory, an Other-space 
to Egypt’s center.  
The perceived Otherness of the Sinai has often animated and justified efforts by the 
Egyptian government to domesticate and transform the space through law, though these 
efforts often appear to be partial and incomplete.  In this thesis, I argue that the Sinai has 
been constructed not just as an Other-space, but as an Outlaw space whose dangerous and 
threatening nature both justifies and requires measures that call not only for sanctioning 
and transforming the space, but also for containing, controlling and even ignoring it.  I 
further propose that this dynamic is not unique to the Sinai but is indicative of a 
contemporary moment in the relationship between law and space that operates on many 
scales.  The construction of spaces as lawless and chaotic, I propose, serves specific 
purposes in relation to the strategic use of law.  Outlaw spaces reinforce the 
characteristics of spaces constructed in their opposition, they justify the exceptional 
behavior of the state within those spaces and they allow for certain strategic and selective 
uses of law in the space to the exclusion of others, facilitating the active 
underdevelopment of those spaces as natural resources and profits are funneled out and 
further distracting from the resulting poverty and marginalization within those spaces.   
Chapter II of this thesis considers the relationship between Egypt and the Sinai and 
the ways in which the two spaces have been co-constructed as a modern nation-state and 
as a frontier zone.  Chapter III examines the various legal geographies of the Sinai 
through the lens of the relationship between international law and the Other.  Chapter IV 
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explores the role of imaginative geographies in the processes of mapping, zoning, 
dividing and constructing space as Outside and Outlaw.  Chapter V concludes by briefly 
exploring the implications for not only the Sinai, but also spaces beyond the Sinai such as 
the black holes, the breeding grounds and the no man’s lands that have proliferated in the 
post-9/11 era. 
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II.  Egypt and the Sinai: The Making of a Nation-State, the Construction of a 
Frontier Zone 
 
The relationship between the Sinai Peninsula and the Egyptian State is one that has long 
been characterized by the state’s efforts to exert control over its population, resources, 
territory and borders in the Peninsula.  But it is equally characterized by the tendency of 
the Sinai – its population, territory and eastern borders—to resist, defy or evade this 
domestication.  From the early stages of modern state formation starting with the rule of 
Mehmet Ali Pasha in 1805 to the period following the resignation of President Mubarak 
in 2011, this relationship has been contested and renegotiated according to economic and 
strategic necessities. 
In this Chapter, I examine the ways in which the machinery of the modern Egyptian 
nation-state has been used in attempts to domesticate the population, territory, and 
resources of the Sinai and the role that law has played in these processes.  While this 
domestication has been crucial to shaping the relationship between the Peninsula and the 
Egyptian state it has also been selective, partial and incomplete.  Interventions in the 
Sinai are focused on securing the state’s strategic and economic interests but have never 
strived for full integration into Egypt. While a comprehensive history of the relationship 
between the Sinai and the Egyptian State is beyond the scope of this thesis, this Chapter 
elucidates the role of the Peninsula in the construction of the modern Egyptian nation-
state and the simultaneous production of the Peninsula as a frontier zone.  
 
A.  Of Citizens and Territory: Producing the Modern Egyptian Nation-State 
Having come into power in what was a highly globalized world with several empires 
competing for domination, Mehmet Ali Pasha had to carefully strategize in order to assert 
himself as the sole ruler of Egypt.  By 1805, the Pasha had successfully transformed 
himself from the governor of an Ottoman province to the sole ruler of Egypt and made 
significant efforts to build a centralized state and assert Egypt’s autonomy from the 
Ottoman Empire.  Crucial in this process of modern state-formation at the time was the 
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ability of the government to define its borders23 and to demonstrate full control over its 
population and resources.  
Mehmet Ali’s government made rigorous efforts to expand and solidify its rule 
over Egypt.  To achieve this, it “employed every possible means in order to penetrate the 
public, external and institutional spheres, and to permeate the consciousness of as many 
social groups as possible.”24 This meant strengthening military, judicial and bureaucratic 
institutions, increasing government reach into urban spaces such as markets and mosques 
and extending the government’s reach into the rural areas and the desert peripheries of 
the country.25  Mehmet Ali sought to settle the tribes in his newly established territory 
whose leaders represented centers of power and whose population was seen to be 
problematic, unpredictable and a threat to the stability of central rule.26  The state sought 
to shift loyalties from tribe to the state to better control the population, but also to help 
protect against enemy threats that could endanger the Pasha’s newly established rule. 
Also at stake was the government’s ability to implement ambitious agrarian and 
economic reforms and to ensure the security and free operation of trade routes, the 
economic lifelines of the country.  
While they represented a minority of the total tribal population in Egypt at the 
time27 those in the desert periphery and border regions presented additional challenges to 
the regime and were often regarded with suspicion and fear.  The Bedouin tribes of the 
Sinai were of particular concern to the Pasha as their presence in the eastern frontier zone 
gave them the power to disrupt important trade routes to Asia and to open Egypt to 
                                                
23 The official location Egypt’s northeastern frontier during various phases of Mehmet Ali’s rule is debated 
but the tribes of the Sinai acknowledged Mehmet Ali’s authority form the beginning of his rule and were 
punished when they disobeyed him. See Yitzak Gil-Har, Egypt’s North-Eastern Boundary in Sinai, 29 
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 138, 135-148 (1993). 
24 REUVEN AHARONI, THE PASHA’S BEDOUIN: TRIBES AND STATE IN THE EGYPT OF MEHEMET ALI, 1805-
1848, 2 (Routledge 2007). 
25 Id.  
26 Mehmet Ali carried out physical settling of Egypt’s tribes through the adoption of measures designed 
restrict the movement of nomadic and semi-nomadic groups. The regime’s land distribution policy 
rewarded sheikhs who persuaded tribes to settle in particular areas and restricted their movement between 
provinces for the first time in history.  Id. at 212-213, 214. 
27 The majority of the tribes in question were located in the Nile Delta and Upper Egypt. 
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potential invaders.28  At the same time, the Pasha saw Sinai Bedouins as valuable allies 
who could assist him in his plans to expand his rule to territories further east.29   
The relationship between Mehmet Ali’s government and Sinai tribes was 
characterized by co-existence through both conflict and cooperation.  The government 
recognized the power of rebellious tribes to disrupt government activities, assist enemy 
regimes and threaten security of trade and transportation.  By adopting an administrative 
policy that provided economic and political incentives to those who would cooperate, 
Mehmet Ali was able to develop mutually beneficial relationships with tribal members 
who in turn assisted him in military, economic and administrative efforts.30  Members of 
the tribal elite then used this relationship to increase their own power and influence as the 
regime became more dependent on their cooperation.  The state’s bureaucratic machinery 
thus produced citizens in the Sinai that were within the reach and control of the central 
government in Cairo, but whose relative independence and resistance to full 
domestication meant that they could never fully be brought within the realm of the law.   
This period set an important precedent in the relationship between the Sinai and the 
Egyptian state.  Mehmet Ali’s government went to great lengths to assert the fixed 
territoriality of the Egyptian nation-state but the Sinai, long a corridor of migration for 
tribes, traders and migrants, seems to have defied these efforts.  Hundreds of years later, 
cross-border familial, tribal, economic, linguistic and political links have remained strong 
and hundreds of underground tunnels crisscross Egypt’s eastern border bringing people, 
goods and weapons to and from the Sinai.  The machinery of the Mehmet Ali regime 
extended its reach to the Sinai and made rigorous efforts at shifting loyalties from the 
tribe to the state in order to produce citizens whose relationship to the state could be 
regulated through law.  The Pasha established elaborate administrative bureaucracies to 
                                                
28 Id. at 5, 31, 102. 
29 During Mehmet Ali’s military campaigns to al-Sham (current day Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine), 
Hejaz and the Arabian Peninsula Sinai tribes served as horsemen and camel-drivers, captured army 
deserters, transported equipment and supplies, and provided security for military convoys.  While some 
tribes cooperated fully, others attacked and robbed caravans traveling along the al-Sham road.  Those who 
deserted the army and were often given refuge by the very sheikhs the government relied on to provide men 
for military service. Id. at 169, 195, 203. 
30 Beyond physical settling, Mehmet Ali’s regime sought to control Egypt’s tribes through the development 
of a centralized administrative bureaucracy. The Pasha appointed special officials, generally from among 
the Ottoman-Egyptian elite of his regime, to manage tribal affairs within a given province or tribe. These 
officials carried out the edicts and directives of the central regime and generally dealt with tribal affairs, 
assisting the Pasha in carrying out punishments and sanctions when necessary.  Id. at 163, 168. 
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facilitate this relationship but it was ultimately the tribes in the Sinai who were able, in 
many ways, to determine their relationship to the state using their peripheral location and 
ability to disrupt trade routes as leverage.  Today, the lack of government control in the 
Sinai and the continued, and some would argue increasing,31 operation of tribal courts in 
the Sinai has marked its population as still not fully domesticated by the law that rules the 
rest of the country. 
The geographic location of the Sinai directly affected its relationship to Mehmet 
Ali’s central government, whose efforts to establish and assert its identity as a modern 
nation-state required that it demonstrate control over its territory, population, resources 
and borders.  The geostrategic and economic importance of the Sinai has only increased 
in the period following Mehmet Ali’s rule, and the residents of the Sinai have retained the 
power to exert significant political and economic pressure on the central government. 
 
B.  A Buffer, a Highway, an Oil Field and a Beach Paradise: The Economic Stakes of 
the Sinai 
The economic value of the Sinai would only increase with the opening of the Suez Canal 
in 1869, with the subsequent discovery of oil, natural gas and mineral deposits in the 
century that followed and again with the development of the Peninsula’s Red Sea coast 
for tourism in the 1990s.  As a territory, the Peninsula has been spatially valuable in 
several ways: as a corridor or “highway” through which goods and resources can pass, as 
a territorial buffer to the Suez Canal at its western edge, and as a site of immense profits 
from both natural resource extraction and tourism.  
                                                
31  While the Egyptian government condones and sometimes denies the existence of informal or 
unauthorized judicial authorities in the Sinai, tribunals and reconciliation councils operating on Bedouin 
law have long been used to settle disputes in the Peninsula.  Some news sources have reported an increase 
in these tribunals following the 2011 uprisings during which many state institutions, including civilian 
courts, ceased to operate.  Attention has also been drawn to the emergence of Sharia tribunals in North 
Sinai, which are operated by Salafi leaders and based on Islamic jurisprudence.  Sharia tribunals issued 
occasional decisions during the Mubarak regime but operated underground to avoid crackdown by the state 
security apparatus. Heba Fahmy, Sharia tribunals on the rise in North Sinai, EGYPT INDEPENDENT, 
(November 17, 2012), available at http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/sharia-tribunals-rise-north-
sinai; Mara Revkin, Islamic justice in the Sinai, FOREIGN POLICY: THE MIDDLE EAST CHANNEL, (January 
11, 2013), available at http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/11/islamic_justice_in_the_sinai; 
Matt Bradley, Makeshift Islamic courts fill the void in the Sinai, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (November 02, 
2012), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443493304578034041459095444.html. 
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 The construction of the Suez Canal at the geographic junction between the Sinai 
and the African continent, connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, was of 
strategic concern not only to Egypt, but also to European imperial powers.  The Canal 
provided European powers with a direct maritime connection to their colonies and 
dramatically shortened the time needed to move goods and natural resources from the 
colonies to Europe.  Despite the fact that it was built by the forced labor of thousands of 
Egyptian peasants,32 the Canal was heralded by some as a symbol of progress that would 
“open up the East to the commerce and civilization of the West”;33 indeed, its 
construction changed the face of global trade and of global politics.  But the day the Suez 
Canal opened would forever change Egypt’s relationship with the Sinai and with the rest 
of the world.  For whoever held the helm of power in Cairo, the Sinai remained a crucial 
and strategic piece of land.  Egypt’s leaders hoped that the construction of the Canal on 
Egyptian territory would propel them into the exclusive club of “modern nations.”34  Just 
as Mehmet Ali had looked to global powers during his reign as models of what it meant 
to be an independent and modern state, his son Said Basha hoped to follow the lead of 
European imperial powers and gain prominence by making full use of Egypt’s valuable 
natural resources and playing an active part in the global economy.  In this way, Said 
Basha hoped and expected that the Suez Canal would lead Europeans to finally recognize 
his country as a genuinely modern state.35    
This hope was not realized; through his attempts to “purchase a better future for 
Egypt using European loans”36 Said Basha drove Egypt into significant debt to fund the 
project at Suez.  This debt would ultimately justify decades of British imperial rule in the 
                                                
32 ZACHARY KARABELL, PARTING THE DESERT: THE CREATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL, 168 (Random House 
2004).  
33 Id. at 4, quoting Ferdinand de Lesseps in an account taken from L’ISTHME DE SUEZ, (May 15 1859) in 
Suez Canal Company Archives, Archives d’Entreprise, la Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de 
Suez, 1995060-1522, CENTRE DES ARCHIVES DU MONDE DE TRAVAIL, Roubaix, France.  
34 Mehmet Ali had initially resisted the idea of a canal at Suez over fears that control over such a waterway 
would prove irresistible to European powers and threaten the gains Egypt had made to wrest itself free from 
foreign rule.  But where Mehmet Ali was an obstacle to the realization of the canal, his son and second 
successor Mohamed Said Pasha proved an eager collaborator.  He dreamed of restoring Egypt’s 
prominence in the region and looked to France and England as models of what Egypt could be but had 
never become. See Id. at 5, ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT JR., A BRIEF HISTORY OF EGYPT, 71-72 (Pennsylvania 
State University 2008). 
35 Emily A. Haddad, Digging to India: Modernity, Imperialism, and the Suez Canal, 47 VICTORIAN 
STUDIES 363, 387 (2005). 
36 Karabell supra note 32 at 5. 
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country and facilitate the movement of canal profits out of Egypt to European 
shareholders.37  It was not until 1952 when Gamal ‘Abd el Nasser nationalized the Suez 
Canal Company that the Canal and its profits fully belonged to Egypt.38  This placed the 
Canal at the center of the national consciousness making it a symbol of political and 
economic independence.  While the Suez Canal is comparatively less crucial to today’s 
world economy it remains an important source of income for Egypt.39  The Canal 
continues to bring in billions of dollars of much needed annual revenue and, in light of 
the Egypt’s faltering economy and the sharp decrease in revenues from tourism since 
2011, the uninterrupted operation of the Canal remains a top priority for the Egyptian 
government.40 
As discussed above, since the inception of the modern Egyptian nation-state, the 
Sinai has represented a strategic stake in light of the important trade routes that cross the 
Peninsula and connect the economies of Africa with those of Asia.  While the sort of 
caravan trade-by-land of previous eras is no longer a part of regional trade, the Sinai 
retains its economic value as a corridor through which Egypt transports natural gas to its 
neighbors.  The Egypt Gas Pipeline and its extension, the Arab Gas Pipeline, were 
constructed under the Mubarak regime and allow Egypt to export natural gas to Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria and, formerly, Israel.41  Natural gas has been a major earner of foreign 
                                                
37 Said’s debts were passed on to his successor. Khedive Ismail was unable to make payments on the loans 
and sold his shares—now making up 44% of the Suez Canal Company— to the British government.37  This 
was only a temporary solution as Ismail’s debt obligations far exceeded the profits of the sale. The Khedive 
was forced to accept an agreement that placed the canal under the French-British ‘Dual Control’ and put 
Egypt’s treasury in the hands of international bankers.37  Soon after, the Khedive’s right to 15% of canal 
profits was sold to a French bank and the Egyptian government ceased to have any financial stake in the 
Suez Canal.  A nationalist armed rebellion followed and in 1882, the British seized the canal and 
established a protectorate over Egypt.37 Karabell supra note 32 at 262, 265-266; Haddad supra note 35 at 
387-388, JOHN MARLOWE, WORLD DITCH: THE MAKING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 271 (Macmillan 1974). 
38 Karabell supra note 32 at 269. 
39 Waleed Abu al-Khair, Suez Canal Remains Steady Source of Revenue for Shaky Egyptian Economy, AL-
SHORFA NEWS, (11 May 2012), available at   
http://al shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/main/2012/05/11/feature-02, Karabell supra note 32 at 6.  
40 Marwa Hussein, Suez Canal Revenues at $5.05 Billion Record High Despite Egypt Turmoil, AL-AHRAM, 
(August 2, 2011), available at 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/17938/Business/Economy/Suez-Canal-revenues-at--billion-
record-high-despit.aspx. 
41 In April 2012, Egypt cancelled its natural gas exports to Israel, who had previously imported 40% of its 
gas from Egypt.  The gas deal, signed by President Mubarak in 2005, has been controversial since its 
inception.  During his 2012 trial, President Mubarak faced corruption charges related to the deal but was 
acquitted in a June 2012 decision.  Mubarak was accused of improperly authorizing the East Mediterranean 
Gas Company to export natural gas from Egypt to Israel at prices lower than those on the international 
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exchange for Egypt in recent decades, an income that depends on the uninterrupted flow 
of gas out of the country.  Like the trade routes of earlier times, the pipeline has proven 
vulnerable to attack as it passes through the Sinai, increasing the importance of 
government control of the region to secure its operation.42 
In addition to its economic value as a buffer and as a corridor, the Sinai Peninsula 
itself has become an important site of oil, natural gas and mineral extraction and, as I will 
discuss in the following section, coastal tourism.  As of 2012, Egypt was the fifth largest 
oil producer on the African continent and a significant portion of the country’s oil 
reserves are located in the Gulf of Suez and in the Sinai itself.43  The majority of Egypt’s 
coal reserves are found in North Sinai and mined by both Egyptian and foreign 
corporations.  The Sinai has become a region that the Egyptian state relies upon in order 
to provide natural resources for domestic consumption by its booming population and for 
lucrative export.  The significant reserves of oil, natural gas and minerals in the Sinai, 
along with its coastal tourist destinations, have rendered it one of the most economically 
important regions of Egypt, territory that must be strategically domesticated and 
controlled, and whose instability could mean significant economic damage to the country.  
 
C.  A Problematic Integration: The Sinai after the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty  
With the creation of Israel in 1948, Egypt’s eastern border in the Sinai became a site of 
increased tension and would come to be a theater of the Arab-Israeli wars in the decades 
that followed. Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 War with Israel and the fifteen-year Israeli 
                                                                                                                                            
market.  Yolande Knell, Egypt Scraps Israel Gas Supply Deal, BBC NEWS, (April 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17808954; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Egypt: Q&A on the 
Trial of Hosni Mubarak, (28 May 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/28/egypt-qa-trial-
hosni-mubarak; Hamza Hendawi, Life Sentence for Egypt’s Mubarak; Sons Acquitted, THE GUARDIAN, 
(June 3, 2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10270577. 
42 Between January 2011 and July 2012, the natural gas pipeline crossing the Sinai was attacked fifteen 
times, often using improvised explosive devices. See EGYPT INDEPENDENT, Gas Pipeline in Sinai 
Bombarded for the 15th Time Since Revolution Started, (July 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/gas-pipeline-sinai-bombed-15th-time-revolution-started. 
43  Tom Jackson, The Top 5 Oil Producing Economies in Africa, Ventures Africa, available at 
http://www.ventures-africa.com/2012/08/the-top-5-oil-producing-economies-in-africa/. 
According to The Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum, 37% of Egypt’s oil production in 2008/2009 came from 
the Suez Gulf and the Sinai.  See The Annual Production of Crude Oil and Condensates Distributed Over 
the Production Regions in the Republic 2008/2009 (246.1 Million Barrels), the Arab Republic of Egypt 
Ministry of Petroleum, available at 
http://www.petroleum.gov.eg/en/AboutMinistry/KeyIndicators/OilKeyindicators/Pages/TheAnnualProducti
onofcrudeoilandCondensatesdistributedamongtheRegionsoftheRepublic20082009(2461MillionBarrel).aspx 
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occupation of the Sinai that followed confirmed the strategic stake the Peninsula 
represented, not just to Egypt, but to the region and world.44  Egypt attempted to force 
Israel to withdraw from the Sinai in the 1969 War of Attrition but failed in what proved 
to be an enormous embarrassment for President Nasser and for Egypt.  Egypt made 
another attempt at reclaiming the Peninsula in 1973 during the October War,45 which 
ended with a mutually agreed-upon cease-fire in 1975.  The Sinai was at the center of 
negotiations that followed, culminating in the US brokered 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace 
Treaty.  Israel agreed to withdraw its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai, returning 
the Sinai to Egyptian control46 in what was celebrated as a victory for both Egypt and for 
other Arab countries in the region. 
 After regaining the Peninsula, Egypt once again sought to determine its national 
boundaries and to re-assert its place as a modern nation-state .47  Officially back in 
Egyptian hands, the Sinai became “an issue of reconquest and national affirmation.”48  
The development plans for the Peninsula that followed were a means by which the 
Egyptian government could emphasize the value of the Sinai to the Egyptian public and, 
in doing so, justify the costs of the military effort to retake it.49  The Sinai was still of 
great geostrategic concern to President Hosni Mubarak, who came to power in 1981, but 
his government was unable to freely exercise its military control over the Sinai due to 
restrictions contained in the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel signed by his predecessor 
President Anwar Sadat.50  Nonetheless, the Mubarak regime sought to reaffirm its 
political and economic control over the Peninsula by establishing connections with 
businesspeople and tribal sheikhs and by expanding the presence of the ruling National 
Democratic Party in the Sinai.   
                                                
44  INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, EGYPT'S SINAI QUESTION, 5-6 (January 2007) 
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/.../Egypt/61_egypts_sinai_question.pdf. 
45 Also known as the Yom Kippur War and Operation Badr.  
46 Article I(2) 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty available at http://mfo.org. 
47 The Taba enclave was returned to Egypt on 18 June 1989 after long and difficult diplomacy that 
“revealed Egypt’s tenacity as it sought to determine national boundaries.” Egypt’s Sinai Question supra 
note 44 at 6. 
48 Id. 
49 SMADAR LAVIE, THE POETICS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION: MZEINA ALLEGORIES OF BEDOUIN IDENTITY 
UNDER ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN RULE 58 (University of California Press 1990).  
50 As I will discuss further in Chapter III. 
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In the period that followed the return of the Sinai to Egypt, the Egyptian 
government was tasked with re-sorting, re-ordering and re-affirming the loyalties of the 
population of the Sinai, a population that had been under enemy occupation for fifteen 
years and who were seen with even more suspicion and mistrust than before.  The 
loyalties of the population of the Sinai would continue to be brought into question in the 
decades that followed.  A 2010 court case, for example, urged the Egyptian government 
to strip the citizenship of Egyptian men married to Israeli women.51  Given the legacy of 
Israeli occupation in the Sinai and the cross-border relationships between Bedouins and 
Egyptians of Palestinian descent, a large number of the estimated 30,000 Egyptian men 
wed to Israeli women at the time were likely to be Sinai residents. 
Today, the exoticized Bedouin nomad of the colonial imagination has little 
resemblance to the population currently living in the Sinai.  “Bedouin,” as Donald Cole 
has pointed out, “has changed from denoting a way of life in the past to marking an 
identity today.”52  That identity remains important for Sinai Bedouins who belong to 
fifteen major tribes that are further divided by family.53 Bedouins tend to see their origins 
as separate and distinct from Egyptians west of the Peninsula and refer to non-Bedouins 
as “Egyptians.”  The Egyptian national census contains no specific “Bedouin” category54 
—and therefore there is no “official” population to be counted—but many of the policies 
and politics of the Egyptian government in the Peninsula have been shaped and 
influenced by the Bedouin category.  
It should be noted that the Sinai Bedouin are not the only inhabitants of the 
Peninsula.  Many Palestinians live in the northern border towns and it is estimated that 
one third of the population of the northern city of el Arish is of Palestinian descent.55 
Additionally, a large number of Egyptians from the Nile Valley now live in the Sinai, as a 
result of ambitious population settlement initiatives following the return of the Peninsula 
from Israeli occupation.  The National Project for the Development of Sinai, initiated in 
                                                
51 Cairo Court Rules on Egyptians Married to Israeli Women, BBC NEWS, (June 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10247437. 
52 Donald P. Cole, Where Have the Bedouin Gone?, 76 ANTHROP Q 235, 235-267 (2003). 
53 Egypt’s Sinai Question supra note 44 at 9. 
54 Cole supra note 52 at 236. Cole notes that “nomads” or “Bedouins” were clearly distinguished in Egypt’s 
censuses in 1907 and 1917 but do not appear as separate categories in later censuses. 
55 Oroub El Abed, The Palestinians in Egypt: An Investigation of Livelihoods and Coping Strategies, 2003 
(American University in Cairo FMRS working paper series, no. 3, 2003).  
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1994, sought to settle 3.2 million Nile Valley Egyptians in the Sinai and to create 800,000 
jobs to employ them by 2017.56  These settlement projects, which coincided with massive 
investment in the tourism industry in the Sinai, focused on the resort city of Sharm el-
Sheikh and other sites along the Red Sea Coast.  The jobs created from the development 
project were primarily given to Nile Valley migrants to the exclusion of Sinai Bedouins, 
many of whom lost their land and livelihoods as a result of these development 
initiatives.57  
As the Mubarak regime turned its attention to the Peninsula’s potential as a 
profitable tourist destination in the 1990s, the Red Sea Coastal areas of South Sinai saw a 
massive increase in domestic and international investments in the tourism industry and 
the Sinai experienced a 16-fold jump in the percentage of Egypt’s total tourist 
accommodations.58  The boom in the tourism industry, however, largely benefitted 
Egyptian and foreign companies.  It provided employment opportunities for workers 
brought in from the Nile Valley while pushing Sinai locals to the economic margins of 
employment and land ownership.59  In North Sinai, where the majority of the Sinai’s 
population resides, “national development plans for the region have remained wishful 
thinking”60 and those development plans that have been implemented have been in 
private hands and shown little benefit to the local population.  This has resulted in the 
overall economic marginalization of the Sinai along with uneven development between 
                                                
56 National Project for the Development of the Sinai 1994-2017, cited in ANDREA VON SARNOWSKI, THE 
ROLE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: PARTICIPATION AND MARGINALIZATION OF 
INDIGENOUS BEDOUIN IN SOUTH SINAI DEVELOPMENT 84 (2011), http://ubm.opus.hbz-
nrw.de/volltexte/2011/2733/pdf/doc.pdf. 
57 Many of Sinai’s tourism centers were originally fishing villages but were either destroyed or relocated to 
pave the way for tourist resorts.  In Nuweiba, fishermen organized to request compensation when a ferry 
terminal built to encourage Egypt-Jordan tourism eliminated their beachfront fishing territory.  Agents of 
the Egyptian mukhabarat (Egyptian secret police) threatened them with jail if they pursued their claim.  See 
Lavie supra note 49 at 76.  Those who continue to fish have often found themselves in a battle with the 
tourism industry that has sought bans against fishing in popular snorkeling and scuba diving areas.  See 
Dalia Farouk, South Sinai governor bans fishing in Ras Mohamed protected area, al Ahram Online (May 
20, 2011) available at http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/12553/Egypt/Politics-/South-Sinai-
governor-bans-fishing-in-Ras-Mohamed-p.aspx.  Egyptian Tourist Police keep constant tabs on Bedouin 
who interact with tourists and, according to the International Crisis Group’s report in 2005, “the [South 
Sinai] governor banned the only activities open to Bedouin –offering camel rides to tourists, acting as 
unofficial guides on trips into the mountains and, especially, holding soirées under a tent at night. Now 
only official tour operators are authorized to organize events in the desert –‘Bedouin parties’ without 
Bedouin.” Egypt’s Sinai Question supra note 44 at 13. 
58 Egypt’s Sinai Question supra note 44 at 9, 13.  
59  Id. at 13-15.   
60 Id. at 17. 
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the South, which has approximately 20% of the population but has received the majority 
of development projects, and the North whose 80% of the population of the Peninsula has 
been largely forgotten in terms of development.  This has led to even higher levels of 
resentment towards the central government and political and economic elites in Cairo.61   
These developments have left many Sinai Bedouin with the impression that far 
from being a part of the Egyptian nation after Israeli withdrawal, the Sinai is closer to 
being the subject of an Egyptian colonialism that implements discriminatory policies that 
firstly privilege outsiders from the Nile Valley and secondly use divide-and-rule tactics 
by favoring the South in development projects.62   Many assert that no meaningful effort 
has been made to integrate the Sinai’s population into greater Egypt.  It seems more 
accurate to say that the re-domestication of the Sinai following Israeli occupation, as has 
been the case in earlier periods in its history, has been carried out along strategic 
trajectories with concern for economic, political and security interests. 
The tensions surrounding the Sinai’s place within the Egyptian nation-state 
surfaced dramatically on a day in October 2004 when three bombs exploded in the South 
Sinai coastal resorts of Taba, Ras Al-Shaytan and Nuweiba, killing thirty-four people.63  
In the summer of 2005, an attack in Sharm el Sheikh killed seventy people, mostly 
Egyptians.64  In 2006, the resort town of Dahab was hit by three more bombs, killing 
nineteen.65  The government initially attributed the attacks to Al-Qaeda, but the alleged 
connection to international terrorism was complicated by the timing of the three major 
attacks on symbolic dates in Egyptian history66 and the high number of Egyptians in 
comparison with Western tourists who were targeted.67  Thousands of “suspects” were 
arrested in the aftermath of the attacks, most of them young men from North Sinai68 and 
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67 Id. 
68 Sadiq Reza, Endless Emergency: The Case of Egypt, 73 NEW CRIM. L. REV  532, 551 (2007), Human 
Rights Watch, Egypt: Mass Arrests and Torture in Sinai 12 (February 2005) available at 
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responsibility was eventually attributed to a previously little-known Egyptian group 
called Tawhid wa Jihad.69   
In the period that followed the bombings, “[b]oth the state’s response and wider 
public discussion [were] confined to the surface of events and … ignored the socio-
economic, cultural and political problems which are at the heart of Sinai’s disquiet.”70  In 
light of decades of marginalization and underdevelopment of the Sinai, in addition to the 
preferential treatment given to the South in development initiatives, there is “reason to 
consider how the attacks may be linked to the question of Sinai and its population in 
relation to the nation as a whole.”71  
 
D.  Sinai after Mubarak  
On January 30th 2011, twelve days before President Mubarak’s resignation, residents of 
the North Sinai town of Rafah called their relatives in Cairo to tell them that they had 
“already finished the revolution” in the Sinai.  This was in reference to the abrupt 
withdrawal of security forces from the Peninsula the day before.  Unlike most of the 
Egyptians in Cairo who protested peacefully during the January 25th 2011 uprisings, 
Bedouin protestors in the Sinai were armed from the outset.  Attacks on police stations 
and prisons in late January and early February 2011 led to the withdrawal of police and 
state security forces and the release of prisoners, many of whom had been held since the 
mass arrests of North Sinai men following terrorist attacks from 2004 to 2006.72  Many 
Sinai Bedouin who felt they had lived as second-class citizens under the Mubarak regime 
celebrated the withdrawal of the state and enjoyed freedom of movement for the first time 
in decades.73 
 In the months that followed, the Peninsula saw continued violence with the 
destruction of symbols and institutions of government, as well as increases in tribal 
vendettas, hostage-taking and car-jacking.74  Arms trafficking through the Peninsula has 
                                                
69 Translated into English, the group’s name means “Oneness [of God] and Holy Struggle.”  According to 
International Crisis Group’s report, the group was  unknown in Egypt prior to the attacks. Egypt’s Sinai 
Question supra note  44 at 1. 
70 Id. at i. 
71 Id. at 1. 
72 Pelham supra note 16 at 5. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 7. 
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come to incorporate a flow of weapons from Libya after the collapse of that country’s 
government in August 2011.75  In August 2012, masked gunmen opened fire on an 
Egyptian Army checkpoint near the Israeli border, killing fifteen soldiers.76  The 
Egyptian government responded with Operation Eagle, which it said would be the largest 
military mission since 1973, would find those responsible and would rid the Peninsula of 
Islamist militants.77  In the weeks that followed, however, many said that while there was 
an increase in military and police presence in the Sinai for the operation, military 
statements were exaggerated and that little was actually being done.78 
 While anxieties surrounding the space of the Sinai seem to have intensified in 
recent decades and particularly following the resignation of President Mubarak in 2011, 
the Peninsula’s relationship to the Egyptian state has always been questioned and 
challenged.  While the new questions have arisen about the absence of the state, the 
emergence of parallel systems of justice and even the potential emergence of a sub-state 
entity, Sinai has always, to some degree, been self-governing.  What is new is that the 
narrative surrounding the Sinai has shifted from one that understands the space as 
problematic, troublesome and challenging to one that sees it as lawless, chaotic and 
ungovernable.   
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/world/middleeast/gunmen-storm-egyptian-base-killing-15-
soldiers.html?_r=0. 
77 Ahmed Aboul Enein, Army Operation Provokes Barrage of Questions, DAILY NEWS EGYPT, (August 12, 
2012), available at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/08/12/army-operation-provokes-barrage-of-
questions/. 
78 Id. 
  22 
III. Legal Geographies: Law and Other-Spaces 
 
As the previous Chapter has demonstrated, the Sinai has played an important role in the 
construction of the modern Egyptian nation-state.  This relationship, however, has also 
resulted in the construction of the Sinai as a semi-detached frontier zone that is outside, 
separate and different from the rest of Egypt.  This idea that the Sinai is an Other-space to 
Egypt’s center has historically rendered it subject to processes of domestication through 
law that often echoes and resembles the civilizing mission.  This chapter explores the 
relationship between law and Other-spaces using Antony Anghie’s concept, which he 
calls “the dynamic of difference.”79  I then detail three techniques employed by the 
Egyptian government, and to a lesser extent the Israeli government, through which the 
space of the Sinai has been legally constructed as Other-space, paving the way for 
exceptional regulation by law.  
 
A.  International Law and its Others 
By entering into a discussion of the relationship between law and Other-spaces, I am 
engaging with an ongoing critical project related to international law and its Others.80  
Throughout history, international law has had many Others: women, culture, nature, 
savages, barbarians, the colonial world and peripheral nations and peoples have all in 
some way been the Other to of the Self of international law.81  These Others, as several 
critical legal scholars have suggested, have played a crucial role in establishing the 
identity of international law and in justifying its use.  Critical legal scholars who have 
engaged the question of international law and its Others have often identified the 
continuities between colonialism and newer forms of imperialism in the twenty-first 
century.  They argue that international law was founded upon European imperialism and 
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80 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS (Anne Orford ed., Cambridge University Press 2006).  This thesis 
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the exploitation of the non-European world and that international law continues to 
reproduce these patterns of power, exploitation and exclusion.82    
While some map these power imbalances squarely between the West and the 
global South or between former colonial powers and their former colonies, others see the 
Self and the Other, the inside and the outside of law as much harder to name in definite 
terms.  In this way, the power imbalances inherent in international law are produced and 
reproduced in different forms through “the complicated and infinite process of 
constituting the self in relation to the other through the institutions of law and 
language.”83  Important in this analysis is the idea that the Other is not produced through 
any specific formula or blueprint, but can be found on different scales and with different 
actors.  The patterns of domination and exclusion established by the colonial encounter 
are reproduced, albeit in different forms, in other relationships such as the relationship 
between a post-colonial state and its minorities,84 or between what some have called the 
Transnational Capitalist Class and the Transnational Oppressed Classes.85  
Antony Anghie argues that the relationship between international law and the 
Other emerges in the perpetual efforts to create and bridge differences between that 
which is universal or civilized and that which is particular or uncivilized.86  This driving 
force of the civilizing mission is what Anghie calls the “dynamic of difference” and is 
both endless and self-sustaining.  It is this compelling invocation of the Other, Anghie 
argues, that drives the creation of new doctrines of international law. But further 
difference is also generated through these processes, rendering the task of bridging and 
incorporating the Other endless because it is forever incomplete.87  As Anghie aptly 
asserts, “each act of arrival reveals further horizons, each act of bridging further 
differences that international law must seek to overcome.”88  In other words, law engages 
in this continual effort to identify difference in order to sanction and correct it along 
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juridical terms, resulting in what Foucault calls “the ever-to-be-accomplished unveiling 
of the Same.”89  These confrontations in turn drive the creation and application of law in 
a given context, reproducing patterns of domination and subordination.90    
This dynamic is not a blueprint for the ways in which the civilizing mission 
approaches difference, rather it is an ever shifting and adapting force that shapes law’s 
interface with the Other.  What becomes important to highlight here is that the Other 
serves a crucial role in giving both purpose and justification to the law as it is animated in 
the never-ending tasks of bridging and transforming.  As Peter Fitzpatrick has argued, the 
law needs this Other in order to reinforce its own identity and meaning.91  The narrative 
of international law as having an inherently progressive value that leads humanity 
towards a superior state of civilization and social development has held enormous sway 
within the discipline.92  Contained in this idea of law as progress is not only a progression 
of humanity towards the universalized and the civilized, but also a move away from the 
particular, the uncivilized, and the Other.93  In this way, as Peter Fitzpatrick argues, the 
identity of law is partially developed by the negation of what it is not, by the negation of 
that which is Other.94  By constructing the identity of the Other as uncivilized, informal 
and primitive, the identity of the law is mutually constructed as civilized, formal and 
modern. 
Anghie’s analysis pays particular attention to the role of the colonial encounter 
and subsequent efforts at decolonization in the development and application of various 
legal doctrines, particularly the central international legal doctrine of sovereignty.95  He 
stresses, however, that “certain structures of thought regarding the ‘foreign’ or the 
‘uncivilized,’ which arise from particular and identifiable historical circumstances, have 
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an enduring presence”96 and that the dynamic of difference continues to operate in new 
forms in the post-colonial state.  Consequently, patterns of domination and subordination 
“are often reproduced, albeit in somewhat modified form, in later encounters with people 
deemed to be uncivilized and violent.”97 
Following decolonization, “the achievement of development became the central 
and defining preoccupation of the new states”98 and the post-colonial state was the agent 
of that development.  Wherever cultural divisions existed within a state, development was 
seen as a means of transcending these divisions by representing the “universal interests” 
of the national population and incorporating difference through the assimilation of 
minorities into the “universal state.”99 The civilizing mission within the post-colonial 
state justified “the intervention of the development state into the many social, economic 
and cultural spheres that had been previously governed by the traditions of the particular 
community involved.”100  
The dynamic of difference becomes useful in understanding the historical context 
of the Sinai and its relationship to the Egyptian state, and can be seen at many stages of 
that history.  Mehmet Ali’s Egypt provides a fitting example of the dynamic at work.  In 
the Pasha’s efforts to demonstrate control over his territory and borders through the 
settling of tribes in Egypt, he encountered unique difficulties in the Sinai where 
nomadism and the cross-border realities of the lives of Sinai tribes were seen as primitive 
and ran contrary to the principles of the modern nation-state he was trying to establish.  
In order to expand and solidify his rule in the Sinai, the Pasha attempted to bridge these 
differences by developing elaborate bureaucracies to reach the tribes, to sanction unruly 
behavior and to transform them into citizens accessible to the centralized state through 
law.    
 The characteristics of the development state described by Anghie emerged most 
forcefully in the Sinai under President Hosni Mubarak in the decades that followed the 
return of the Peninsula from Israeli occupation.  The National Project for the 
Development of Sinai 1994-2017 sought to re-assert Egyptian control of the Peninsula’s 
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resources and population through ambitious initiatives such as the settlement of Nile 
Valley Egyptians in the Sinai, the creation of jobs for these settlers in tourism and 
industries based on raw materials, and the full exploitation of the Peninsula’s natural 
resources.101  The overall objective of the project, as stated by the Egyptian government, 
was “the complete overhauling of the social, economic, political and culture [sic] 
structure of Sinai,”102 a transformative effort that would be initiated and facilitated by 
law.   
 
B.  Law and Other-Spaces 
There is an inherent spatiality to Anghie’s theory as he describes the bridging of gaps that 
exist between law and the Other in the crossing of what could be imagined as a physical 
void between us and them.  Anghie describes the “acts of arrival” and the revealing of yet 
“further horizons” through the dynamic of difference creating an image of an endless 
physical expansion and extension of the law as it reaches across space and territory to 
bridge and overcome difference.  Anghie contends that “it is primarily in the peripheries, 
the non-sovereign, non-European world that sovereignty is completely unfettered, 
directed and controlled only by its ingenuity in constructing the uncivilized in ever more 
innovative ways which then call for new elaborations, applications and refinements in 
sovereignty.”103   
Throughout history, it is not just the populations and governments of the 
peripheries that are the object of Anghie’s dynamic of difference; these relationships are 
also spatialized and contained within Other-spaces such as the colonial territories, the 
League of Nations mandate territories, so-called developing countries and, more recently 
Rogue States and the Axis of Evil.  While the population of the Sinai has often been the 
object of efforts at domestication, integration and transformation through law, the space 
of the Sinai has also been subject to exceptional legal regulation, creating particular legal 
geographies within the Peninsula. 
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C.  Legal Geographies of the Sinai Peninsula 
The Sinai, while of enormous economic and political importance, has also represented a 
space of vulnerability in the modern Egyptian nation-state.  Egypt’s eastern border 
anxieties with Israel and Gaza have only intensified in light of regional security tensions 
in recent decades and the Egyptian government has responded through the selective 
domestication of the population, territory and resources.  These efforts often come in the 
name of security and in the form of law.  In other words, the Sinai is not only imagined as 
an Other, outside or vulnerable frontier space, it is also aggressively regulated as such 
through law.  In contrast to descriptions of the Sinai as a law-less region there is, in fact, 
an abundance of law in the Peninsula.  In considering the Sinai as a hyper-regulated 
space, however, it must be noted that laws are not applied in a blanket but along specific 
trajectories resulting in heavy regulation in some areas and none in others,104 according to 
the strategic interests of the state.   
The Sinai is regulated by several distinct but overlapping legal geographies. Like 
other regions of the country, it is subject to general Egyptian law, to international laws 
contained in international treaties signed by Egypt, and to customary international law.  
Furthermore, the Sinai is exceptionally regulated by international and domestic laws that 
apply exclusively to the Peninsula.  At the international level the 1979 Peace Treaty 
applies strictly to territory lying east of the isthmus of Suez and west of the border with 
Gaza and Israel.  The 1981 protocol to the treaty relating to the presence of Multinational 
and Force Observer international peacekeepers, too, finds its application only on the 
Peninsula.  At the domestic level, the Sinai is regulated by a large body of additional 
regulations related to security, land ownership, private property, development, resource 
exploration and extraction, tourism, migration and border management.105  Egypt’s 
decades-long emergency law has resulted in exceptional legislation and security measures 
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in the country, many of which have been directed at the Sinai and its population.106  
Additionally, Israel’s application of its anti-infiltration law has at times found its 
application on the Peninsula as Israeli soldiers cross into Egyptian territory in order to 
pre-emptively arrest those they believe intend to enter Israel illegally.107  Through these 
overlapping legal geographies, the political, cultural, historical and legal relationships 
between Egypt and its colonizers, between Egypt and Israel, between the Egyptian 
government and its subjects, and between Nile Valley Egyptians and Sinai Bedouin are 
mapped and layered onto the territory of the Sinai through law.108    
This exceptional legal mapping is important because it demonstrates the ways in 
which law’s efforts at sanctioning or transforming the Other through law apply not only 
to people and populations, but also to space.  To demonstrate this, I have chosen three 
examples of the ways in which these legal geographies have operated in the Sinai as an 
Other-space within the Egyptian state.  First, the Sinai has been constructed as a 
contested battleground in contrast with other regions of the country that sit securely 
within Egyptian sovereignty.  Second, the Sinai has been constructed as an empty space 
in contrast to the densely populated and resource-scarce Nile Valley.  Finally, the Sinai 
has been constructed as a porous and dangerous frontier zone, a precarious periphery to 
Egypt’s center.  
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1.  Sinai as a Battleground  
The Sinai’s role in the region’s military history has led it to be called Egypt’s “eternal 
battleground”109 and the Peninsula has absorbed and embodied many national and 
regional tensions.  On the one hand, the Peninsula represents a source of Egyptian 
national pride resulting from the military victory that resulted in the return of the 
Peninsula to Egypt following fifteen years of Israeli occupation. Regionally, many see the 
re-taking of the Sinai as the last major Arab victory against Israel.  Behind that victory, 
however, lies the national embarrassment of having lost the Peninsula to Israel in the 
1967 War in the first place.  The memory of the Israeli occupation serves as a reminder 
that the Sinai is a space of vulnerability for Egypt and that its status as Egyptian territory 
is not fully assured.  Nearly forty years after the end of hostilities between Egypt and 
Israel, the image of the Sinai as a tenuous warzone remains.   
While the Sinai has been an actual battlefield at many points in history, its legal 
construction as such was intensified with the creation of Israel in 1948 and the Arab-
Israeli Wars that followed.  At the beginning of the 1948 War, Egyptian forces entered 
the former British Mandate of Palestine through the Sinai and several battles took place 
on the Peninsula when Israel entered its northeastern corner.  Following the Arab defeat, 
the 1949 Armistice Agreement situated the new state of Israel at the Sinai’s eastern edge, 
with the exception of the Gaza Strip, over which the Egyptian government was made 
temporary custodian and which it administered until 1967.110  The Sinai was seized by 
Israel during the 1967 Six Day War, and remained under Israeli occupation until the last 
settlements were withdrawn in 1982.  During this fifteen-year period, the Peninsula was 
subject to several overlapping regimes: some Egyptian laws still applied in the space, 
some laws were implemented by Israeli occupying forces, and the Peninsula was further 
regulated by the international laws of occupation contained in the 1907 Hague 
Convention and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention.111  
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The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, which officially returned the Peninsula to 
Egypt and initiated Israeli withdrawal from the space, continues to intensively regulate 
the Sinai.  The Peace Treaty established “limited force zones,” that span the entire 
Peninsula, from the Suez Canal to the Egypt-Israeli border, including a narrow strip of 
Israeli territory.   The four zones, labeled A through D, are distinguished by the varying 
levels of Egyptian military, Egyptian police, Multinational Force Observers and Israeli 
military presence permissible under the treaty.112  Zone A begins as soon as one crosses 
the Suez Canal and enters the Sinai and each consecutive zone is characterized by 
increasing regulation as one moves closer to the Egypt-Israel and Egypt-Gaza borders.  
While very limited numbers of Egyptian troops are allowed in western and central 
portions of the Peninsula, Zone C in far eastern Sinai is entirely demilitarized.  The zone 
continues to be patrolled by roughly 1,600 Multinational Force Observers (MFO) who 
were given a role in the supervision and implementation of the security provisions of the 
treaty in the treaty’s Annex I and in an additional protocol negotiated in 1981.113  
The legacy of the Sinai as a battlefield and a military buffer continues to shape 
Egypt’s politico-legal and military approaches to the Peninsula and to its population.  As 
I discussed in Chapter II, despite the fact that the Sinai was returned to Egyptian control 
more than thirty years ago, suspicions remain as to the loyalties of its inhabitants, a 
population that was occupied by the enemy for fifteen years.114  Many laws and policies 
that have been applied to the Sinai in recent decades evidence these questioned loyalties 
in nuanced ways and have blatantly marginalizing effects.   
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A striking example of this marginalization can be found in the legacy of 
restrictive land ownership laws in the Peninsula.  Law 143 of 1981, known as the Desert 
Lands Law,115 which applies to all Egyptian land two kilometers outside of city limits, 
holds enormous implications for land ownership in the Sinai.  The law considers wad al-
yad, which literally means “to put hands on” and refers to de facto ownership of land 
without official documents, to be in violation of state property.116  This means that the 
state does not recognize land ownership in many places the Sinai, where property may be 
passed down for generations according to customary law but in the absence of official 
documents.  Anyone found to be illegally occupying state lands may face imprisonment, 
fines and land seizure.117  Particularly relevant to the Sinai is the fact that the law 
prohibits all land ownership in strategic military areas, which are defined by the Minister 
of Defense.118 Law 632 of 1982 expands upon the 1981 law with stipulations specific to 
four areas of the country, including the Sinai.119  This law allows for private ownership of 
desert lands in some cases where the land has been farmed for more than three years, but 
requires the person hoping to claim the rights to their property to go through a lengthy 
and complicated process that involves submitting proof of ownership, maps and 
blueprints to a government committee.120  Even if the application is approved, the 
Minister of Defense may override the decision should he decide to designate the land in 
question as part of a strategic military area.121 
In the absence of official ownership in the eyes of the state, local populations 
have continued to follow customary procedures for property ownership contained in 
Bedouin law.  In sharp contrast to the restrictions placed on Sinai inhabitants with regards 
to land ownership, however, the Tourism and Development Authority encouraged private 
sector investment in tourism in the 1990s by offering reclaimed land in South Sinai for 
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purchase at $1.00 USD per square meter.122  The market was transformed and many 
locals were stripped of ownership rights in the name of development.123  
The 2012 Law for the Comprehensive Development of the Sinai Peninsula 
contains an article that opens up government-sanctioned land ownership to Sinai 
inhabitants, but requires proof of the sole Egyptian nationality of the buyer and of his or 
her parents.124  The wording of the law is unclear with regards to implications for 
inheritance, but has left many dual nationals, foreign nationals married to Egyptians and 
individuals whose parents hold another nationality anxious about the future consequences 
of the law.125  Later in 2012, the Minister of Defense invoked his power under Law 143 
of 1981 and prohibited all land ownership within five kilometers of the North Sinai 
border with Gaza and Israel, an area inhabited by approximately 10,000 families.126 
In another example of marginalizing policies in the name of military concerns in 
the Peninsula, young men native to the Sinai, particularly Bedouins and those whose 
families are from the city of el Arish, are drafted into the military at much lower rates 
than the rest of the population. Those who are drafted are typically put into low-stakes 
positions, outside of the Sinai and far from strategic and security concerns.  While it is 
not an official rule, it is generally known that Bedouins are not accepted into Egyptian 
Police and Military Academies and are excluded from high-ranking police and military 
positions.  Considering that these are some of the most secure and respected jobs 
                                                
122 Egypt’s Sinai Question supra note 44 at 14. 
123 Id.  
124 Executive Law no. 14 of 2012, Art 8 (Executive Regulations for Law 14 for the Comprehensive 
Development of the Sinai Peninsula) Official Gazette, Issue 210, 13 Sept. 2012.  
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Decree no. 298 of 1995 (Security of the Eastern Border of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt) Official Gazette, Issue 39, 28 Sept. 1995 (Egypt). 
125 Sarah Carr, New Ownership Regulations in Sinai are Worrying for Many, AL-MASRY AL-YOUM 
(January 14, 2012) available at http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/new-ownership-regulations-sinai-
are-worrying-many. 
126 Armed Forces Decree no. 203 of 2012, Official Gazette, Dec. 2012 (Egypt). See also, Defense Minister 
Bans Private Land Ownership on Eastern Border, AL-MASRY AL-YOUM, (December 23, 2012), available 
at http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/defense-minister-bans-private-land-ownership-eastern-border; 
Sinai Bedouins Balk at Uprooting Families Near Border, WORLD TRIBUNE, (February 8, 2013), available 
at http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/02/08/sinai-bedouins-balk-at-uprooting-families-near-border/. 
The military recently announced that this decision would be reversed following meetings with tribal leaders 
who had previously threatened to block the international road to Rafah and roads to industrial areas in 
central Sinai if their demands were not met. See Second Field Army Chief Says Sinai Residents Allowed to 
Own Lands, AL-MASRY AL-YOUM, (April 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/second-field-army-chief-says-sinai-residents-allowed-own-lands, 
Sinai Tribes Give Ultimatum on Land Ownership Ban, AL-MASRY AL-YOUM, (January 22, 2013), available 
at http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/sinai-tribes-give-ultimatum-land-ownership-ban. 
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available and in light of the high rates of unemployment—particularly youth 
unemployment— in the country,127 these exclusions come at a great cost. 
 
2.  Sinai as Empty Space 
 “We have known four periods of occupation [ihtilal]: British, Egyptian, Israeli and, for 
the last 30 years, Egyptian again.  Look, there they are, the colonialists of today.”128 
 
The notion of empty territory, or terra nullius, has played an important role in the 
processes of legal legitimation of conquest and the movement of colonial settler 
populations into colonized spaces. In order to justify the claiming of space already 
inhabited by indigenous societies, land is often rendered as vacant, uninhabited, or empty. 
The legal category of terra nullius has lost its relevance as the imagined “white spaces on 
the map”129 have been divided up and claimed by colonial powers. There remains at the 
level of the imagination, however, “a persistent longing for a yet unknown and unclaimed 
frontier, a terra nullius… a nostalgic longing for a virgin territory … as yet unmapped, 
still awaiting the cartographer’s pen and the explorer’s gaze.”130    
 Since the return of the Sinai to Egyptian control following the end of Israeli 
occupation, the Peninsula has not only been seen as empty space to be claimed, it has also 
been legally constructed as such. This was particularly evident in Egyptian laws and 
government policies in the early 1980s promoting the settlement of Nile Valley migrants 
in the Sinai. From 1982 onwards, following the dismantling of the last remaining Israeli 
settlements from the Peninsula, the Mubarak regime sought to integrate and control the 
Sinai through encouraging large numbers of migrants from the Nile Valley to settle in the 
Sinai.  As I discussed in Chapter II, the National Project for the Development of Sinai 
1994-2017 aimed to provide for the settlement of millions of Egyptians from the Nile 
                                                
127 Unemployment rates for young people (from 15-29 years old) reached 77.5% in 2012.  Half of Egypt’s 
population is under 25 years old and 90% of Egypt’s unemployed are young adults.  See Egypt’s 
unemployment rate hits record high in second quarter, AHRAM ONLINE, (August 14, 2012), available at 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/0/50405/Business/0/Egypts-unemployment-rate-hits-record-
high-in-secon.aspx, Population Reference Bureau, Youth Revolt in Egypt, a Country at the Turning Point 
(February 2011) available at: http://www.prb.org/Articles/2011/youth-egypt-revolt.aspx. 
128 Egypt’s Sinai Question supra note 44 at 22, citing an interview with a young university graduate from 
Sheikh Zweid, June 2006. 
129 Nesiah supra note 108. 
130 Id. at 10. 
  34 
Valley in the Sinai, and to create hundreds of thousands of jobs for these migrants.  In 
contrast to the Nile Valley, an overpopulated space of increasing scarcity, the Sinai was 
seen as an empty space of opportunity into which these migrants could be settled, and be 
absorbed by the tourism industry in the Peninsula as laborers.  Notably, the government 
plan does not mention the Bedouin population in its section on “objectives, mainstays and 
potentials.”131  The report states instead that “[the] Sinai is a model of national pioneer 
development in which new and unconventional policies of building new societies are 
implemented,”132 implying a lack of existing “societies” within the space. 
 Large swaths of the Sinai are composed of sparsely inhabited desert and harsh 
mountain terrain, but portions of the northern industrial areas are relatively heavily 
populated and the rest of the Peninsula is far from empty or uninhabited.133  Nonetheless, 
Egyptian laws and policies have often treated the space of the Sinai as vacant and 
uninhabited, ignoring the well-established structure of property rights contained in 
Bedouin customary law and paving the way for colonial policies of land, resource and 
contract allocation.  As I discussed in Chapter II, Nile Valley migrants brought to work in 
Sinai industries are given preferential treatment in employment and housing upon arrival, 
resulting in systematic discrimination against local populations.  In the resort town of 
Sharm el Sheikh, for example, all building plots were allocated to Egyptian and foreign 
companies investing in tourism and the vast majority of the tens of thousands of jobs 
created in the city went to non-locals.134  In North Sinai, too, Cairo businesspeople 
control much of the industrial sector, employing primarily Nile Valley workers and 
providing little benefit to local populations.135   
 
 
                                                
131 GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT, NATIONAL PROJECT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINAI 1994-2017, Chapter 2, 
cited by David Homa, Touristic Development in Sinai, Egypt: Bedouin, Visitors, and Government 
Interaction, 241 in TOURISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION (Ramy 
Farouk Daher ed., Channel View Publications 2007). 
132 Id. (italics added by Homa). 
133 Nearly 400,000 people in the coastal plain of North Sinai province and a further 160,000 live in South 
Sinai.  While these numbers are small in comparison to the total population of roughly 83.5 million, the 
Peninsula’s population is growing at some of the fastest rates in the country. Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, (2012) http://www.capmas.gov.eg/book.aspx. 
134 Egypt’s Sinai Question supra note 44  at 13. 
135  Id. at 17; Faultlines: The Battle for Sinai (Al Jazeera December 19, 2012) available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/faultlines/2012/12/2012121874352233407.html. 
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3.  Sinai as a Border 
Egypt’s eastern border in the Sinai has long been a source of anxiety and vulnerability for 
the state and has been regulated and securitized in ways that distinguish it from Egypt’s 
southern and western borders.136  The reach of the state in the Sinai is limited by the 
transnational nature of the lives of many of the Peninsula’s inhabitants, characterized as 
they are by economic and familial ties across Egypt’s the eastern border.  These 
relationships, as I discussed in Chapter II, have contributed to questions about the 
national loyalties of Sinai residents.  In addition to national concerns, Egypt receives 
pressure from the Israeli government to control the movement of arms, militants and 
migrants across the Gaza and Israel borders.  Furthermore, Egyptian border guards have 
been known to enact shoot-to-kill policies at the Israeli border, using lethal force against 
individuals –particularly African migrants— leaving Egypt to cross into Israel.137   
 These concerns, however, are not limited to the actual border.  While Egypt’s 
border with Israel and Gaza appears as a line on the map, the Sinai itself has been legally 
constructed as an extended border that spans the entire Peninsula, extending the 
application of the types of laws and policies typically seen at national borders.  It is not 
unusual for a border, particularly a militarized border, to have a zone on either side in 
which individual access and economic activity are restricted or forbidden altogether.  
These zones, however, are rarely more than a few kilometers wide, are generally 
uninhabited and are deemed to be outside the normal operations of the state.138  The 
Sinai, on the other hand, a Peninsula of more than 61,000 square kilometers, is nearly 
twice the size of Egypt’s Nile Valley, three times the size of Israel, 200 times the size of 
Gaza and contains two of Egypt’s governorates.139  Nonetheless, through the exceptional 
security measures related to land ownership and the movement of goods and individuals, 
the entire Peninsula has been constructed and treated as an extended zonal border.     
                                                
136 A 1995 Presidential decree applicable only on Egypt’s eastern border from Rafah to Taba, prohibits the 
presence of individuals within 150 meters from the border without permission from the military and makes 
specific reference to the tunnels passing under Egypt’s eastern border.  Passing illegally into this border 
zone renders an individual subject to penalties such as prison terms, fees and hard labor.  President of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt Decree no. 298 of 1995 (Security of the Eastern Border of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt) Official Gazette, Issue 39, 28 Sept. 1995 (Egypt). 
137 See e.g., Sinai Perils supra note 8. 
138 The Korean Demilitarized Zone, for example, the most heavily militarized zone in the world, is four 
kilometers wide and, with few exceptions, access is prohibited.  
139 Pelham, supra note 16 at 1. 
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 The movement of goods and individuals through the Sinai is heavily regulated 
through the presence of both military and police checkpoints.  While it is not unusual to 
find an occasional security checkpoint on roads in other parts of Egypt, the number of 
checkpoints on roads through the Sinai far exceeds those found in other governorates.  
When entering the Sinai at the Suez or Port Said crossings, individuals and vehicles are 
stopped at military checkpoints and must pass through procedures similar to an 
international border crossing.  All individuals are required to present their identification 
and foreign nationals must show visas or proof of residency.  Individuals are questioned 
as to their reasons for travel to or through the Peninsula and drivers of commercial 
vehicles are required to provide documentation for their cargo and to allow military 
officials to search their vehicles for prohibited goods.  These border-like procedures are 
often repeated at additional military and police checkpoints across the Peninsula. 
 Each of the above examples—the Sinai as a battleground, as empty space and as 
an extended border—constructs the Peninsula as an Other-space that is distinct and 
different from the rest of Egypt.  Just as law seeks to bridge the differences between us 
and them through efforts at sanctioning and transforming individuals and populations, a 
similar approach is taken to Other-spaces.  Through the identification of the various types 
of Otherness embodied by the Sinai, law becomes both animated and justified: as a 
tenuous battleground, the Sinai must be protected from the enemy and from those 
disloyal to the nation-state; as an empty space it must be filled and settled, its resources 
plundered; as an extended border, it must be exceptionally regulated and securitized.  
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IV. Imaginative Geographies: Mapping the Outlaw 
 
“This mattered, I realized then, because representations are never merely mirrors held 
up to the world; they enter fully into its formation.”140  
   
On a street in downtown Cairo in late 2011, a wall covered in freshly painted graffiti 
addressed the Supreme Council of the Armed Forced (SCAF), the military body ruling 
Egypt at the time:  “You act like lions in the Square but you act like women in the Sinai!”  
In nearby Tahrir Square, a group of protesters called on Egypt’s military rulers to transfer 
power to a civilian body, echoing the message painted on the wall, “If you are strong, go 
back to the border and show us your strength there!” and “Why are you here in the 
Square? In the Sinai, the enemy will have free reign.”  
Through these chants the Egyptian protesters called on the military to stay out of 
politics and to restrict their role to that of national security, while simultaneously 
criticizing them for failing to exercise effective control over the Sinai during their rule. 
But there is also a spatial narrative –not to mention a gendered narrative— in these 
statements and demands; Tahrir Square is rendered as a space of politics whereas the 
Sinai is constructed as the space of “real” danger where military force is both necessary 
and legitimate.  Tahrir Square is imagined as the space where the Egyptian people engage 
in protests and political negotiation with the Egyptian government, whereas the Sinai is 
the place where the unnamed enemy141 lurks and must be confronted.  Cairo is imagined 
as the center, the heart of the country where internal issues are named and negotiated 
whereas the Sinai is conversely imagined as an exterior space which, if not effectively 
policed, will render the entire country vulnerable to the enemy.   
As I have argued in the previous chapters and as reflected in the spatial narrative 
above, the Sinai has been constructed as an Other-space that is somehow outside and 
separate from the Egyptian state, while still inside its borders and a part of its national 
territory.  This characterization has come about from a number of converging points 
related to the geostrategic location of the Peninsula, its role in regional military history, 
its economic value, and tensions associated with its population, whose “Egyptian-ness” 
                                                
140 DEREK GREGORY, THE COLONIAL PRESENT IN AFGHANISTAN, xiii (Blackwell 2004). 
141 While the ‘enemy’ is unnamed in some chants, it is named as Israel or the Zionists in other chants, such 
as “Military, military, the way you beat us, who do you think we are, Zionists?” 
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and loyalties to the state have often been questioned.  As such, the Egyptian government 
has at times approached the Sinai and its population through strategic efforts at 
domestication and national integration through law.  In this way, the dynamic of 
difference described by Anghie is an appropriate mode of analysis for much of Egypt’s 
approach to the Sinai, which has been constructed as an Other-space to be bridged, 
transformed and brought inside the Egyptian nation-state through law.   
There is a different tone, however, to the understanding of the space of the Sinai 
contained in the chants coming from Tahrir.  The national narrative surrounding the Sinai 
no longer includes discussions of reclaiming, of national affirmation, of settlement or of 
integration—and not because the Egyptian state has achieved assimilation and unification 
of the Sinai with the rest of Egypt more than thirty years after its return from Israeli 
control.  To the contrary, the integrity and identity of Egypt’s eastern border zone is 
perhaps less assured than it has been in decades.  As the chants and graffiti indicate, the 
Sinai is seen as a space in which the actions of the state are shaped by geostrategic and 
security concerns and in which efforts are thus focused on containing and controlling the 
Peninsula, rather than transforming it. 
   
A. Imaginative Geographies 
The narrative of the Sinai that emerged from Tahrir Square during anti-SCAF protests in 
2011 imagines a particular geography of the Egyptian nation-state and the ways in which 
that space may be divided, labeled and understood.  The term “imaginative geography” 
was first used by Edward Said in his critical discussions of Orientalism to describe the 
universal though often arbitrary “practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space 
which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs.’”142  Said argues 
that while these geographic divisions between our space and their space may not be 
entirely fictional, they are less a fact of nature than of human production.143  As Derek 
Gregory further elaborates, “[w]e might think of imaginative geographies as fabrications, 
a word that usefully combines ‘something fictionalized’ and ‘something made real,’ 
                                                
142 EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 54 (Penguin 2003) (1978). 
143 Edward Said, Orientalism Reconsidered, CULTURAL CRITIQUE 89, 90 (1985). 
  39 
because they are imaginations given substance.”144  But imaginative geographies not only 
demonstrate the space that is ours and the space that is theirs, they also describe them as 
having particular characteristics. Additional meanings are invested at many other levels, 
designating spaces of safety and spaces of danger, spaces of wealth and spaces of 
poverty, spaces of weakness and spaces of power.   
Increasingly, these spatial imaginations are converted into indexes, maps and 
online info-graphics.  The Democracy Index,145 the Poverty Index,146 and even the 
Happiness Index147 are accompanied by colorful maps that divide, categorize and display 
various spaces in order to tell us where and to what extent these defining characteristics 
can be found.  The Failed State Index148 provides a telling example of the ways in which 
spaces that are imagined as chaotic and lawless mapped.  The Index lists 177 states and 
ranks them from most failed to least failed, from Somalia to Finland.149 
The Failed State Index’s interactive website does not provide a definition of a failed 
state,150 but rather gives each state a score of failed state-ness, calculated according to 
various political, social, economic and security criteria.151  
In order to give the reader a visual understanding of state failure around the globe, 
the Failed State Index displays a map of the world, colored by country in “critical” red, 
                                                
144 Gregory supra note 140 at 17.  
145  Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index Map (2012),  
http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=info&info_name=infographic_democracy (last accessed April 15, 
2013). 
146  Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative, Mapping the MPI, 
http://www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/mpi-data-bank/mapping-the-mpi/. 
147  The New Economics Foundation, Happy Planet Index: The Data, (2013)  
http://www.happyplanetindex.org/data/ (last accessed April 15, 2013). 
148 Foreign Policy co-published with the Fund for Peace, The 2012 Failed States Index: Interactive Map 
and Rankings, (2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive (last accessed 
April 15, 2013). 
149 Id. 
150 The term ‘failed state’ first came into use the early 1990s when an article in Foreign Policy Magazine 
warned that “a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of 
sustaining itself as a member of the international community.” In reference to such states, the authors 
described a descent into violence and anarchy that threatens not only the life and liberty of the citizens of 
those states, but of their neighboring and, indeed, the whole world.  Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, 
Saving Failed States, Foreign Policy 3 (1993).  In the decades that followed, Foreign Policy Magazine 
turned what they had once described as a novel situation into one that was updated on an annual basis 
through the interactive Failed State Index website Id. 
151 The criteria that collectively determine a state’s score on the Index are: demographic pressures, 
refugees/IDPs, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economic decline, de-legitimization of 
the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention. 
Failed State Index supra note 148. 
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“in danger” orange, “borderline” yellow, “stable” chartreuse, and “most stable,” a 
coveted green.  At the center of the map, Africa has been largely red-washed, the crimson 
seeping into most of the Middle East and Central Asia, while the bulk of the Asian land 
mass is colored “in danger” orange.  The Americas are a mixed batch spanning the 
spectrum from “critical” Bolivia, Colombia and Haiti to “most stable” Canada 
slumbering in the north.  By clicking on a country on the Failed State map the viewer can 
see its score and rank alongside arrows indicating whether the state has moved up or 
down on the list in the past year.152  A Watch List is also provided to warn the viewer of 
those states whose stability is deteriorating as they are imagined to be slipping towards 
the edge of failure.153  
While no new official borders are drawn on the map, the color-coding of countries 
according to their failed state-ness employs Said’s imaginative geographies creating 
meaningful new boundaries and new divides, and reconfiguring the way we imagine 
space on the global scale.  In this case it is not just our space and their space, but also 
normalcy and emergency that are separated along geographic lines.154  The map 
confidently displays where in the world there is safety and where there is danger, where 
we will find stability and where we should expect to encounter violence and disorder.  
The map tells us which states are failed and which states may be sliding towards an 
imaginary cliff of chaos and collapse.  It also tells us, crucially, which states are not-
failed, sitting securely in dark green stability.  It tells us which places are not dangerous 
and not a risk for us, whether for adventure or investment. 
                                                
152 Fund for Peace’s sister website awards “Most Improved” in 2012 to Kyrgyzstan and “Most Worsened” 
to Libya.  Fund for Peace, The Failed States Index 2012, available at http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-
2012-sortable (last accessed April 15, 2013). 
153 A link on Foreign Policy’s Failed State 2012 home page directs the viewer to a site called “Postcards 
from Hell.”  Here one can embark on a visual tour through “The World’s 60 Most Fragile Countries.”  An 
Afghani girl stands screaming in the center of a pile of bloody bodies in the wake of a suicide attack.  AK-
47 wielding Yemeni soldiers ride on top of a camouflage pickup truck barreling through jihadist territory. 
A Syrian flag flies in the forefront of a landscape of bombed out buildings. Protestors in several places are 
beaten by police. A malnourished Ethiopian child swats a fly.  Maoist supporters wield flaming sticks in 
Nepal.  A one-legged doll lies in the dusty street of a Congolese city.  The viewer can also visit “Was the 
Arab Spring Worth It?” (Libya, Egypt and Syria made huge leaps up the ladder of failure), “10 Reasons 
States Fall Apart” (so that perhaps it can be avoided) “How to Help Somalia” and, for those who were 
wondering, “What’s Wrong with Pakistan?” Foreign Policy, Failed States 2012, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates2012 (last accessed April 15, 2013). 
154 Gross, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?’, 112 YALE LJ 
(2003) 1011, at 1076. 
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 While the particular spatial reading of the Failed State Index has chosen the state 
as its site of analysis the same processes and methods of mapping could be applied to a 
region within a given state, an entire city, a neighborhood within a city or any number of 
other spaces as sites of failure.  In the case of Egypt and the Sinai, we can see this sort of 
mapping operating on several scales.  If the protesters in Tahrir Square map the Sinai 
bright red as the “real” space of danger, this would be contrasted with the friendlier 
chartreuse that might color the Egyptian territory west of Suez.  In times of violent 
unrest, on the other hand, Tahrir Square, the Presidential Palace, Port Said and a number 
of other spaces within mainland Egypt may turn orange or red.  In military terms, the 
Sinai would be internally color-mapped according to the zones set out by the 1979 Peace 
Treaty, resulting in a rainbow-like spectrum beginning with a “borderline” yellow at the 
Suez Canal and becoming more and more red as one moves east across the Peninsula, 
approaching Egypt’s border with Gaza and Israel.   
For holidaymakers and for Egypt’s Tourism Authority, the Sinai would be 
mapped in yet another manner, one that distinguishes the Red Sea coastal resort areas of 
South Sinai from the center and northern regions of the Peninsula.  The Red Sea coastal 
resort area might be mapped as a “fairly stable” green, a space of pleasure and leisure for 
wealthy Egyptians and foreigners visiting from abroad.   This swath of safety would be 
centered at Sharm el Sheikh, moving along the coast in both directions, enveloping 
several smaller resort towns such as Dahab, Nuweiba, Taba and Ras Sidr and the string of 
gated beach condo communities in between. Those wishing to visit Egypt’s Red Sea in 
the Sinai are advised to arrive to their coastal paradise by plane, flying over and thus 
avoiding the risky and shadowy portions of the Peninsula that are mapped in an orange-
red hue of unpredictability.  This coastal green-zone is disrupted, of course, by the 
occasional kidnapping of a foreign tourist or by a bomb set off in a seaside restaurant, but 
these are seen as mere aberrations demonstrating the need for better policing of the 
boundaries between zones of safety and zones of danger.  Following the 2005 bombing at 
the tourist market in Sharm el Sheikh, government officials initiated the construction of a 
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1.5-meter high fence around the resort city155 which, had it been built,156 would have 
been a physical manifestation of already imagined boundaries between the two spaces.   
While this sort of mapping can be used to display the presence or absence of any 
number of elusive characteristics of a place – such as democracy, poverty or happiness-
there is an added level of significance when it is applied to the Sinai and other spaces that 
are zoned as lawless, dangerous or chaotic.  Zoning, according to Guillermina Seri, is 
“the distinction between spaces of safety and spaces of lawlessness and exception.”157  
“Normal” spaces under this model are characterized by the preeminence of the rule of 
law, as contrasted with zones of exception in which the juridical order has been 
suspended.158 Within Seri’s zones of exception, “different sorts of signs, languages, lives, 
identities and forms of production coexist without any recognizable pattern other than 
crisis and corruption.  Anything may take place in these zones, and does take place in 
them.”159   
Seri argues that zoning has been the primary activity of sovereign power since its 
origin.160  By zoning and dividing up space, the sovereign exercises its power to 
determine which zones will be designated as normal spaces and which will be labeled as 
zones of exception.  In this sense, the act of defining and contrasting normal and 
exceptional spaces represents the decision through which the sovereign can both frame 
and stabilize its power.  Applying Giorgio Agamben to the processes of dividing, carving 
up and labeling space, we see that the identification of places that are deemed to be 
lacking rule of law serve the purpose of making more visible and emphasizing the 
importance and stability of those spaces where the rule of law is present.161  These spaces 
are not merely Other-spaces that present a challenge or a task for law, but often appear to 
                                                
155 The fence was to be 20km long, surrounding the entire city and forcing vehicles to pass through 
checkpoints in order to enter.  It would also wall out a nearby Bedouin settlement where many workers 
lived. See, Fence to Protect Red Sea Resort, BBC, (October 18, 2005), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4354666.stm; Egypt’s Sinai Question supra note 44 at 13. 
156 The project was abandoned after a fierce press campaign against it, in which some used the term jidar, 
an implicit reference to the Israeli separation wall under construction at the time in the Palestinian 
Territories. Egypt’s Sinai Question supra note 44 at 13. 
157 Id. at 79. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Guillermina Seri, On the "Triple Frontier" and the "Borderization" of Argentina: A Tale of Zones, in 
SOVEREIGN LIVES: POWER IN GLOBAL POLITICS 79-97 (Jenny Edkins et al. eds., 2004). 
161 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., The University of Chicago Press, 2005) 
and HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998). 
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elude or resist such transformative processes altogether, requiring and justifying other 
approaches that may instead aim to contain, control or simply ignore them.  These spaces 
are seen as threatening and dangerous and are mapped not only as Other, but also as 
outside and as Outlaw. 
 
B. Mapping Outlaw Space  
The notion of Outlaw space proposed here is not intended as a blueprint or formula, 
though it may be a useful as a way to connect the Sinai with the other spaces I mentioned 
in the introduction of this thesis, the no man’s lands, the black holes, the security 
vacuums and the breeding grounds that seem to have proliferated in the post-9/11 era.  
My goal is to bring to light certain patterns in the relationships of power in these spaces 
that are often characterized as chaotic, ungovernable or lawless when the realities of what 
is happening within those spaces and how they came to be that way is much more 
complex.  
The choice of the term Outlaw space is not an attempt to engage the imagery of 
the romanticized cowboy wanderer or the fugitive bank-robber and gunfighter of the 
American West, though this fantasy figure has been invoked more than once in the case 
of the Sinai.162  The Outlaw in its human form, it is worth noting, is understood as having 
crossed a line and entered into the space outside the law, at which point the prosecutor is 
released from his duties.  Efforts at transformation through law that would be applied to 
the criminal or to the uncivilized subject are then abandoned.  This is not to say that he is 
forgotten about.  When an individual exists on the “wrong” side of this line, he is also 
outside of the sphere of legal protection and subject to whatever fate or punishment 
should befall him.163  Additional measures may be taken against the Outlaw in order to 
control his actions or to contain the damage the he may cause.  In yet other cases, just so 
long as he does not cause too many problems, the Outlaw may also be ignored.  Outlaw 
space, too, is seen as existing outside the law.  Contrary to the imagination of these 
spaces as lawless, however, law is still present but works in strategic ways and along 
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specific trajectories that aim not necessarily to sanction and transform, but sometimes to 
simply contain, control, exploit or ignore. 
I have also chosen the term Outlaw space for its application in the more literal 
sense: that which is outside of the law, as opposed to that which is in-law, or inside the 
realm of the law.  This basic juxtaposition, as I will elaborate further in this section, is 
complicated by the presence—even the superabundance— of law in Outlaw spaces but it 
remains essential to the value of these spaces in processes of mutual construction and the 
exercise of power through the zoning, dividing and labeling of space.  In distinguishing 
between the out and the in of law in spatial terms, lines and boundaries are drawn around 
spaces in an attempt to define and give a certain territoriality to that which is Outlaw.   
The Sinai as an Outlaw space is easily imagined and labeled according to its relatively 
self-contained geographic nature as a Peninsula but in reality, there is nothing natural 
about these spaces and it is not always clear where they begin and where they end. 
Outlaw space has much to do with a particular imagination of space as dangerous 
and threatening but that space is not Outlaw according to any inherent or pre-defined 
characteristics.  In fact, the characteristics of Outlaw space itself are often secondary to 
the ways in which it is imagined and constructed through law.   Referring back to the 
quote with which I began this Chapter, representations of a space are never merely 
mirrors or descriptions of existing realities but may enter into the fabrication of those 
spaces.  In this way, Outlaw space is performative in that “it produces the effects that it 
names.”164  This is not to say that Outlaw spaces are mere fantasies.  These spaces may 
very well be dangerous and difficult to control but by imagining them as lawless, we are 
precluded from seeing the ways in which law is present, and may indeed contribute to the 
precariousness of the space.  By understanding these spaces as ungovernable, we cannot 
see that they are often governed in very specific and strategic ways.  By imagining them 
as black holes or vacuums we are unable to see the presence of normalcy and order that 
exist within these spaces and the ways in which people continue to live their lives facing 
challenges that, on many levels, resemble those faced by people in “normal” spaces.  
John Marx notes this normality in his comments on Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s novel 
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Half of a Yellow Sun,165 in which the author gives an account of the Nigerian crisis that 
culminated in the Biafrian War.  Marx observes that, 
couples fall in and out of love, families mourn, and children grow up in 
communities displaced and devastated by conflict.  People starve and die 
in the refugee camp where the novel’s final chapters are set, but they also 
write poetry, have sex, and engage in intellectual debate…166   
 
This portrayal of life in what was seen by the world as an Outlaw space “suggests 
that what goes on in the most unstable of states is never so extreme that it cannot 
be normed.”167 
Outlaw spaces are important because they serve particular purposes.  First of all, 
the processes that produce Outlaw spaces simultaneously co-produce spaces that are in-
law.  This reinforces characteristics of in-law spaces that are imagined to be linked to the 
the presence of law, safety and order.  If we return to Fitzpatrick’s argument that the 
identity of law itself is constructed through the negation of that which is not-law, the 
identity of in-law spaces, too, are constructed in opposition to spaces that are Outlaw.  In 
creating boundaries that illustrate the presence of Outlaw spaces, “law itself becomes 
formed in ways that secure its integrity.”168  These divisions between in-law and Outlaw 
are produced not only through the drawing of new lines, but also by re-imagining, 
moving, removing, fragmenting or differentiating existing boundaries.169  Law is thus 
imagined to have collapsed or deteriorated in Outlaw spaces while maintaining its 
integrity in places that are in-law.  In this way, drawing attention to the failure and 
collapse in the Sinai may serve to distract or draw attention away from, for example, 
Egypt’s failing economy and deep unrest in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt’s center. 
Outlaw spaces, then, serve the purpose of assigning a territoriality to our anxieties in 
order to locate it in spaces that are elsewhere.   
Secondly, Outlaw spaces serve the purpose of justifying the exceptional behavior 
of the state, behavior that would otherwise be seen as unacceptable in in-law spaces.  In 
the Sinai, rounding up and jailing hundreds of men from cities in the north following the 
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explosion of a bomb across the border in Israel is more easily justified if the space is 
zoned as a breeding ground for terrorism.  In Rio, a pre-dawn operation in which a fleet 
of 1,500 police and navy commandos backed by armored vehicles occupy a 
neighborhood in Rio is more easily justified if that neighborhood is a zoned as a lawless 
slum run by drug lords.170  It becomes yet more acceptable in light of the upcoming 
Olympic Games in the Rio, around which walls –real or imagined—of law, order and 
security are built.  Once Rogue States are zoned as such, those who are suspected to of 
possessing or to intending to develop weapons of mass destruction become the subject of 
a “legitimate” attack.171   
Thirdly, zoning a space as Outlaw allows for certain strategic and selective uses 
of law in the space to the exclusion of others. In spaces like the Sinai, this means that the 
state can still access the oil, gas and other natural resources of the Peninsula remaining 
indifferent to the torture, rape and extortion faced by kidnapped migrants on the 
Peninsula.172  Furthermore, this zoning facilitates the state in its active economic 
underdevelopment of the Sinai as it funnels natural resources and their profits out of the 
Peninsula.  By constructing the Sinai as an Outlaw space, the state can then explain the 
poverty that results from this underdevelopment as resulting from the so-called deviant, 
lawless or chaotic behavior of the population of the Sinai as opposed to acknowledging 
the ways in which this behavior may be partially caused by poverty and marginalization.  
For example, in early 2012 a group of Bedouin activists held a sit-in in the south Sinai 
town of Wadi Feiran to ask the government for running water in their homes and 
development projects to ease unemployment in the town.173  When they received no 
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acknowledgement from the government, the group decided to detain two busloads of 
European tourists visiting a nearby monastery.174  The tourists were released unharmed 
after five hours but not before the governor’s security chief, panicked over potential 
effects on already low levels of international tourism, agreed to meet with the group.175  
A few days later, members of the same tribe kidnapped two Americans and their 
Egyptian guide in the same area, this time in an effort to win the release of relatives they 
felt had been jailed unfairly.176  In both situations, the kidnappings came in an effort to be 
heard by the government in a region where the population has often been ignored. 
 
C. Beyond Defensive Imperialism: Containing and Controlling Outlaw Space 
The Sinai has been constructed as Other-space– namely a battleground, an empty space 
and a border zone—but it has also been constructed as Outlaw space. Outlaw space 
differs from Other-space in that the Otherness in question is deemed to be somehow 
dangerous or threatening.  Anghie’s theory portrays a similar confrontation with a 
dangerous and threatening Other as he discusses the most recent manifestation of the 
dynamic of difference as seen in the War against Terrorism following the attacks of 
September 11th, 2001.  Anghie argues that contemporary imperialism has shifted its 
motives and strategies in order to confront this dangerous and threatening Other, namely, 
the terrorist.177   
The War against Terrorism, Anghie points out, continues the goals of the 
civilizing mission but with an important shift: rather than seeking to achieve the salvation 
of “backward” or “uncivilized” peoples, this newer form of imperialism –which Anghie 
calls “imperialism as self-defense”- is concerned instead with ensuring the safety of the 
American people.178  According to the thinking of the War against Terrorism, this task 
must be accomplished by using pre-emptive self-defense (PESD) against the Rogue State 
in order to transform its society through democracy promotion initiatives.179  Anghie 
argues that in the post-9/11 era, the task of transforming the Other “has acquired an 
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unprecedented urgency, an imperative character, precisely because it is now so 
powerfully linked to the idea of self-defence and survival, not only of the United States 
but of civilization itself.”180   
Anghie’s theory, however, fails to fully capture the Egyptian state’s approach to 
the Sinai because it still implies an ambition or an intention to transform the Other 
through law.  In the Sinai this has not necessarily been the case.  Where the Egyptian 
government once hailed the reclaiming of the Peninsula as an opportunity for re-
integration and national affirmation, the space of the Sinai has increasingly been cast 
outside and excluded.  Where the state once sought to transform the Peninsula through 
ambitious development efforts that would result in “the complete overhauling of the 
social, economic, political and culture [sic] structure”181 of the Peninsula, these efforts 
have been largely abandoned.  The question remains, then, as to what happens if the acts 
of bridging described in the dynamic of difference become impossible or when subjects 
and spaces slip from the grasp of the law, resisting or eluding the attempts at integration 
and transformation.  What happens if the moment of arrival described by Anghie is 
interrupted or never transpires?  Or, perhaps more importantly, what happens when this 
process of bridging to Other-space through law is not seen as being in the interest of the 
state or of the world and previous efforts are abandoned?  
Instead of efforts at transformation along juridical lines, the Egyptian state has 
come to favor an approach that partially or fully abandons the civilizing mission and 
instead aims to merely contain and control the space of the Sinai.  In a performance of 
space that assigns territoriality to the anxieties of the Egyptian state and other actors in 
the region, the Sinai is seen as a potential breeding ground for Islamic extremism.   But 
while some voices call for this threat to be addressed or neutralized, others see 
containment as a higher priority and raise a red flag when this extremist threat spills over, 
the bounds of the Peninsula, threatening shift or expand to other provinces.182  The threat 
associated with the Peninsula, according to the Egyptian government, must be contained 
within that space. 
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In the case of the group of Bedouin activists in Wadi Feiran, the state ignored 
initial demands from the sit-in but was forced to respond when reports of the kidnapping 
of foreign tourists reached the international media.  They diffused the situation by 
promising a meeting with a government official if the tourists were released.  Media 
reports do not mention whether or not the demands for running water in the homes of the 
townspeople and projects to ease unemployment were addressed by the state but a 
meaningful government response is unlikely given the history of marginalization on the 
Peninsula.  Reports do indicate, however, that none of the relatives of the kidnappers who 
were in prison were released, nor were any of the kidnappers arrested.183 The concern of 
the state in this case is neither to resolve the issue by agreeing to the terms of the 
activists, nor is it to sanction and punish the kidnappers through law.  By agreeing to a 
meeting with the activists, the state was able to contain and control the immediate 
situation and to re-draw the lines between the safe spaces of tourism and the shadowy 
spaces of danger within the Peninsula but pursued it no further once the tourists were 
released.  The concern of the state, then, is not to correct or transform the space but rather 
to contain and control the space to the extent that it can ensure that its inhabitants do not 
kidnap tourists for too long, blow up too many pipelines, or let too many migrants into 
Israel, or cause too much disruption to access to the Peninsula’s natural resources.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to shed light on the relationship between the Egyptian state and the 
Sinai Peninsula in a way that draws connections to a broader global narrative of chaotic, 
lawless and ungovernable spaces that has proliferated in the post 9/11 era, but that also 
seeks to disrupt and move beyond that narrative.  I have argued that by way of 
imaginative and legal geographies, the Sinai has been constructed as an outside and 
Other-space long before it entered the international spotlight following the 2011 Egyptian 
uprisings.  Rather than creating a rupture in the relationship between Egypt and the Sinai, 
the withdrawal of the security apparatus in the early months of 2011 only brought to light 
and intensified dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that had been at play since the 
formation of the modern Egyptian nation-state and perhaps before.   
At the same, there has been a subtle shift in the relationship between the Sinai and 
Egypt in recent decades, one that, this thesis proposes, is indicative of a larger shift in the 
relationship between law and space, between the nation-state and territory.  This shift has 
led to the construction of the Sinai—and places beyond the Sinai—not only as Other-
spaces, but also as Outlaw spaces.  Mapping and labeling certain zones as outside the law 
is deceptive.  There is nothing natural about Outlaw spaces and it is not always clear 
where they begin and where they end.  While Outlaw spaces are imagined as law-less, 
law may still be present –even abundant—in the space but works in strategic ways and 
along specific trajectories.  
Whether Outlaw spaces are dangerous, lawless, chaotic or not, the drawing of 
boundaries and labeling of the spaces they demarcate amounts to a forceful exercise of 
power and has important implications for the ways in which the space will be regulated, 
not regulated or selectively regulated through law.  Zoning a space as Outlaw not only 
creates truths about that space, it also seeks to provide an explanation for the nature of 
these spaces and in doing so, asserts the opposite qualities of in-law spaces that are 
constructed at the same time.  These processes of mapping, zoning, dividing and labeling 
of space are not just a tool for the use or non-use of law within a space, they also seek to 
provide a narrative for why the imperial eye of law has failed in its efforts to infinitely 
extend its reach to sanction and transform the Other.  
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Antony Anghie’s theory on the relationship between international law and the 
Other, as expressed through the dynamic of difference, is useful in understanding some of 
the ways in which the Egyptian state has attempted to transform the space of the Sinai 
through law.  The theory, however, fails to fully explain the use of power in Outlaw 
spaces because it assumes that there is always an ambition and an intention to bridge the 
void between us and them, and to transform the Other through law.  As I have 
demonstrated in the case of the Sinai, this is not always the case.  As Outlaw space, the 
Sinai is not just constructed and located as outside, it is in many ways cast outside into a 
space that is actively defiled.184  A space that is defiled will not necessarily be sanctioned, 
transformed or rebuilt, it may instead be simply contained, controlled, exploited or 
ignored.  
By examining the force of both legal and imaginative geographies in the context 
of the Sinai, I have attempted to highlight broader dynamics of power that may be useful 
in understanding spaces beyond the Sinai, such as the “black holes,” the “breeding 
grounds,” the “security vacuums” and the “no man’s lands” that have proliferated in the 
post-9/11 era.  By going beyond these opportunistic labels, we may be able to better 
identify patterns in where we find the Outlaw, in how the lines are drawn between in-law 
and Outlaw, and in the functions that these spaces serve to those spaces that are 
constructed in their negation.  A spatial analysis of this sort enables us to better see the 
links between state policies toward a population within a given space as they relate to the 
presence and desirability of natural resources within that space.  Furthermore, it allows us 
to see the powerful meaning invested in Outlaw spaces, the important consequences for 
the people who live in or pass through that space and the ways in which, as Anghie would 
say, the Sinai Bedouin is connected to the Iraqi and the Native American, along with the 
inhabitants of any number of Outlaw spaces, all of whom have been seen as threats to 
security and who “challenge [a] system of government that is extended to incorporate 
them.”185  But beyond this, it enables us to also see the situations in which those subjects 
slip from the grasp of the law at the same time as efforts at extending, bridging and 
transforming are partially or fully abandoned in favor of containment and control.  
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Finally, to return to my starting point, a theory of Outlaw space may give us a way of 
understanding the “hundreds of bodies” of Eritrean migrants as resulting from much more 
than just a vacuum of unfortunate lawlessness, chaos and violence. 
 
 
